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Karen Dalke, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

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Abstract

We sometimes look to our closest primate relatives when exploring culture, while excluding other species. Rather than expect animals to conform to the definition of culture constructed by humans, what if we use other anthropological concepts to explain another species? Horses are very social animals with hierarchies and gendered behaviors. The mustang bridges the divide between domestication and the wild. With holding facilities needing to adopt more horses, perceptions that these horses cannot adapt to domestic settings must be overcome. Because these horses can live without human care, the traditional training approaches are often met with resistance by mustangs and they are deemed resistant or unadoptable by humans. As an anthropologist, I began to wonder if a mustang could adapt more easily to a domestic setting if one approached the situation from a culturally relative position. This stance requires an understanding of mustang behaviors, organization, and body language within their special context. This paper will explore the transition from a free-ranging mustang in Colorado to his introduction to a domestic herd. The “acculturation” process of my adopted mustang will assist in building ontology of features, which may apply to species beyond horses.

 

Keywords: Culture, mustangs, anthropology, acquiescence, horses, social learning, behavior, interspecies communication, human-animal, acculturation.

Introduction

Researching the mustang and its symbolic meaning to American culture began as a dissertation project in 1999. At that point, I did not know anything about horses and my only riding included prestigious events, such as the pony ride at the local fair during my childhood. My first roundup, a term for systematically removing excess horses from the public lands, was in the Little Bookcliffs of Colorado. It is a range I have visited many times. This paper discusses the adoption and acculturation of Cortez, a yearling colt captured in the Bookcliffs. Within three days, Cortez was trapped, transported to a government processing center, vaccinated, and transported to my farm in northeastern Wisconsin.

When I began my research on mustangs, the first question upon my arrival to most roundups was, “What is an anthropologist doing here?” or “What does anthropology have to do with horses?” These questions were often followed with a statement highlighting the importance of wildlife management, biology and genetics in determining what was best for “these horses.”

Anthropology is a holistic discipline that studies similarities and differences over time. It seeks, often through ethnography, to understand and compare cultural phenomena. Anthropology is the study of culture, but it is still difficult to define this term (Williams 1983). Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952) review of the culture concept shows that exclusively human is either stated or implied. These definitions also point out that culture is shared, taken for granted, and learned. However, as McGrew (1992) points out, perhaps “most of the quoted authors never considered the possibility of non-human culture, presumably because no convincing evidence then existed of natural populations of other species showing behavior resembling culture” (73).

In the United States, anthropology has moved to focusing on the use of symbols. Perry (2009) argues that primatologists use a definition that focuses on social learning and ignores the cognitive complexity of human culture. She adds that determining whether a particular species possesses culture depends on the definition used. The underlying assumption of this paper echoes the perspective of McFarland and Hediger (2009) in Animals and Agency: “other animals can be thinking subjects, knowing subjects, self-conscious subjects, subjects with complex and substantial subjectivity that we call agency” (16).

Anthropology cannot escape its roots in colonialism. There is still an issue of inherent power between the observer and the observed. Over time, as a discipline, we have recognized some of our errors in our relationship with the Other (Peacock 2001). Research over the last ten years suggests a re-examination of our relationship with other species often referred to as the species turn:

If we take otherness to be the privileged vantage from which we defamiliarize our “nature,” we risk making our forays into the nonhuman a search for ever-stranger positions from which to carry out this project. Nature begins to function like an “exotic” culture. The goal in multi-species ethnography should not just be to give voice, agency or subjectivity to the nonhuman—to recognize them as others, visible in their difference—but to force us to radically rethink these categories of our analysis as they pertain to all beings [personal communication, March 29, 2010]” (Eduardo Kohn, quoted in Kirksey and Helmreich 2010).

In this case study, I wanted to re-examine the basic elements of acculturation and the likelihood of interspecies understanding. I must disclose that I do not typically organize species into some hierarchical structure and my focus was not on training, but understanding how to relate to a different culture. As with any ethnography, there is a holistic presentation including history, context, specific examples and interpretation. This paper will utilize this approach to tell the story of Cortez’s acculturation into a domestic setting supported by current research in animal cognition and social learning.

 Going into the Field

“Going into the field” is central to anthropology. The field could be anywhere, but for me it was literal. I have travelled to the Little Bookcliffs of Colorado several times over the past 13 years for my ethnographic research on the mustang controversy. Understanding the context where Cortez began his life would aid in creating a relationship with him. When studying human culture, behaviors may seem strange, but understanding the original context reveals new understandings.

The Little Bookcliffs Wild Horse Range was established in 1974 when “27,065 acres were set aside ‘for continuous, exclusive use by wild horses,’ and 28,822 acres were reserved for seasonal use by cattle and sheep.” (Wheeler 1998, 45). The Little Bookcliffs Wild Horse Area, near Grand Junction, Colorado, was established by the Secretary of the Interior to protect the mustangs and settle disputes over grazing rights. This range, along with the Nellis Air Force Base and Pryor Mountain Range, are the only three ranges that are exclusively horses. Like all other ranges, they must be maintained for multiple uses, including wildlife, habitat, and the mustangs. Because mustangs have relatively no real predators except for mountain lions on some ranges, herd populations can increase about 20 per cent every few years. It is for this reason, that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conducts census data on a rotating basis every three to four years and determines whether excess animals must be removed from the range and offered for adoption.

With a decline in the United States economy, there was much concern regarding the ability to find adoptive homes for mustangs at the 2007 Little Bookcliffs Roundup. Participants at roundups and Friends of the Mustangs volunteers helped me identify other places and people in the West who were valuable for my research on the mustang issue. In an effort to repay the kindness shown to me by participants in these roundups, I adopted two yearling mustangs. I am only reporting on one of the mustangs adopted at that time: Cortez.

Cortez was given his name by Friends of the Mustangs. Friends of the Mustangs is a non-profit volunteer group formed in 1982. This group works with the BLM in maintaining trails, conducting foal counts, creating lineages, checking water sources and promoting adoptions of mustangs (personal communication). Cortez was the “grandson” of my favorite horse on the range called Barron. His sire was Silver (blue roan) and his dame was a nine-year-old dun mare called Sundance. No one is sure of the origins of Sundance. One account said she may have been dropped off on the range as a foal, but another account states she has been having foals since she was a two-year-old.

The part of the range that Cortez lived on is known as Indian Park. The range has mainly canyons and ridges covered in sagebrush, pinyon, and juniper. There is a creek that flows most of the year through Main Canyon, but man-made pools and natural springs along with snow melt or thunderstorms provide water. Canyon walls amplify noise, but can also provide shelter. Vegetation including perennial grasses, Mormon tea, shade scale and salt brush provide forage. Numerous birds, black bears, coyotes and an occasional mountain lion are other wildlife found on the range. Since this is a public land that can be used by anyone for recreation, mustangs are exposed to a variety of vehicles, hikers, and hunters (Wheeler 1998). This landscape is dramatically different than northeastern Wisconsin.

My farm is only ten miles from Green Bay, Wisconsin. The most dramatic differences between Grand Junction, Colorado and Green Bay, Wisconsin are the precipitation, altitude and the number of sunny days. Winter can begin with snow in November and last until April. Average snowfall is near 50 inches and thunderstorms are common during the summer. The soil is quite fertile and by May the countryside is made of endless shades of green.

The Roundup

The primary responsibilities of the BLM, as dictated by law, are to preserve and protect wild horses while managing for healthy rangelands, as discussed in the previous chapter. Capturing and removing wild horses from public lands is a part of actively managing them. This process is called the Roundup, or the gather. This involves bringing together various participants, building temporary structures called traps into where the wild horse herds are collected, sorting the herd into various groups and making decisions as to which horses should go through the adoption program, be placed in private holding facilities, destroyed for health reasons, or returned to the range.

The wild horse roundups are not held on a regular schedule. Environmental data collected by the BLM determines when a gather will occur. Once it is determined that the herd size needs to be reduced to aid in the protection of the range, a roundup or series of roundups are scheduled. They usually last for a week or two between the months of July to February. Participants of the roundup include BLM employees, volunteer groups, animal advocates, and sometimes contracted employees. Roundups are an excellent time to learn and observe horse behavior in another context. Ethologists often speak of horse behavior as a uniform set of actions. However, humans exist in environments that constantly change and elicit different behavior in varying contexts. Having a historical understanding of a cultural context with an understanding of major life events would be beneficial in understanding the acculturation process for humans so why would it be any different for horses? For example, a “Judas horse” is either a domestically bred horse or gentled mustang that waits at the mouth of the trap with its handler and runs into the trap when the helicopter pilot requests it over the intercom. The term is a Biblical reference depicting betrayal. Because horses are herd animals, the mustangs will follow the Judas horse into the trap. Although they will follow this horse, once in the trap, the Judas horse must be removed immediately or will be kicked at by the recently trapped mustangs. Although the same species, there is a recognition of the Other.

The roundup in 2007 began on September 15th. Cortez was captured on the 19th and arrived at my home in northeastern Wisconsin on September 23rd. During those few short days, he was captured, transported in a horse trailer with other yearlings to the local rodeo grounds in Grand Junction, Colorado and received his first immunizations. He was held at the rodeo grounds where he was viewed by potential adopters. At that time, we adopted both Bandita and Cortez for $500 each. We decided to adopt two mustangs, as these yearlings had never been without a herd and it was an attempt to minimize stress (Werhahn, Hessel and Van den Weghe 2011).

Culture is Taken for Granted

Mustang adoptions occur at different times and locations throughout the year. In 2007, the mustang adoption for the Little Bookcliffs Roundup occurred after the target level of horses was reached. After each day of the roundup, horses identified for adoption were sent to the rodeo grounds. Other horses not selected were released back to their specific range. Horses are separated by age and gender. Throughout the gather week local community members and tourists can see the mustangs up close. The horses have never been kept in confined areas or experienced humans in such close proximity. A heightened awareness exhibited by the mustangs erect ears, widened eyes and contracted muscles ready for flight mimic the “culture shock” of an anthropologist entering into a new field site.

On the day of the adoption, sheets of paper are placed outside each pen area. The horses wear a number around their neck and individuals place bids and counter offers for a designated time period. The person with the highest bid adopts the horse. The level of knowledge about horse behavior varies across potential adopters. The Friends of the Mustangs volunteers are available to answer questions and assist with loading horses after adoption. One wrangler felt that most Americans no longer use horses every day and as a result lack the skill and knowledge to train a mustang that has not been raised in a domestic setting, saying, “Any horse can be tamed. Some are better at it, but it can be done” (personal communication). Concern regarding potential adopters exists and volunteers attempt to help by offering possible trainers to assist with the transition to captivity.

Since many potential adopters have never seen a mustang on the range, they approach the confined horses based on prior interactions with domestic horses. Yelling to a friend, “Come look at this one!” can startle the mustangs, sending them crashing into the gates that confine them. The behavior of the horses is understood differently by those observing them. The horses are acting like they would to any sudden movement. It is taken for granted by many observers that all horses are the same and they will understand the human gestures. As an anthropologist, I was not concerned with the “correct” interaction. It was obvious through these observations that the humans had little awareness that a different species may act differently. From both perspectives, animals are doing what is ordinary. Unexpected reactions by the mustangs, or agency as Jane Desmond (2002) would suggest, results in the creation of a myth that they are wild and not trainable. It is true that mustangs are adopted for the same reasons someone would want a domestic horse: trail riding, show, working cattle, etc. However, a foal raised by humans accepts a gentle pet on the neck. They have been acculturated to accept the interspecies greeting. The reaction by a mustang to the same behavior is unpredictable. The “speciescentric” belief that the mustang should, “just understand” (Fox 1990). These cultural moments, as I refer to them, result when normative reactions suddenly change. If the interaction is viewed through agency devoid of hierarchy, how might that inform interactions?  Could interactions with Cortez from a culturally relative position result in acculturation to his new home? Rather than training an animal, could a relationship be formed through respectful recognition of difference?

An immediate issue of consent arises from this assumption, as the human is controlling the context. This issue will be discussed in the next section of this paper describing a specific greeting behavior between the two of us.

Figure 1

Culture is Shared

According to Ember and Ember (2012), “For a thought or action to be considered cultural, some social group must commonly share it” ( 16). Participant-observation is a hallmark of anthropological fieldwork. It would be my observations of Bandita and Cortez that would reveal a shared behavior.

There are several requirements made of adopters, including a 400 square foot area with six foot high walls free from protrusions must be available per mustang. Releasing a mustang into an open pasture is not allowed nor is mesh or electric fencing until the mustang accepts human handling. The shelter must have at least two sides, cannot utilize a tarp, and must provide protection from inclement weather (Bureau of Land Management 2011). These specifications are required to reduce the likelihood of injury or escape by a newly adopted mustang.

A 1,600 square foot converted calf barn with sand footing and 6 foot concrete walls would be the new home for Cortez and Bandita. The north side of the calf barn had four foot windows the length of the barn to allow light and the ability to see the pasture and other horses. There are curtains on these windows that can be closed or opened based on the weather. It also has three large lights that can be turned on as the seasons change and days become shorter. The mustangs were transferred to this area by backing the trailer up to the service door and allowing them to leave the trailer when they felt ready. There was water in a heated tank and grass hay in a larger tractor tire.

For about a week, there was no attempt at interaction and the focus was on just feeding the horses and cleaning their area. Like most field work, it begins with an emphasis on observation. Bandita and Cortez had come from different parts of the Little Bookcliffs Wild Horse Range. On several occasions during their first week, they would approach each other after being at opposite sides of the calf barn. It was a shared process, as either would initiate it. The mustangs would approach each other on a curve facing each other. They would sniff as they moved their heads closer together. Once this “greeting” had been completed they might allow grooming or simply stand near each other. This allogrooming serves as a practical means of shedding and insect control, but also relieves stress and enhances social bonding (McDonnell 2003, 72). Observations of these encounters suggested some sort of mediation. Since it is impossible to determine the horses’ intentions, it appeared as though there was agreement to participate in grooming. ‘Acquiescence,’ that is, a situation in which individuals are selected to conform to social norms and regulations” became a useful concept on my future interactions with Cortez (Wenseleers,  Hart, and Ratnieks 2004, 156). Although there is no way to know what he wants to do, I could simply offer him the option to not participate with me. Ultimately, we do not know if an animal wants to create a relationship with us. However, that discussion is better suited to a philosophical discussion beyond the parameters of this paper.

Although both were said to be 1 year of age, Bandita accepted human contact quite easily and would shield Cortez by placing her body between any human and him. After a while, we began to separate the two horses by a sliding door where they could still see each other, but would interact individually with humans. Within a couple of months, Bandita could be haltered and led, but Cortez would still move away. Bandita was placed in a box stall about 200 square feet in size with a barred window allowing her to interact and observe the domestic horses. Cortez remained in the calf barn able to see the other horses in the adjacent barn and a radio was turned on with music and talking throughout the day. It was obvious that Bandita was adjusting, but visitors to the farm would remark how Cortez was wild and “I needed to show him who was boss!” (personal communication).

Several months with little adjustment did cause concern. Instead of listening to the visitors to the farm, I reflected on my observations and interactions with Cortez.  Stone (2010) has shown that human facial discrimination exists in domestic horses. She states that this may not be the case in mustangs that are not reliant on humans for care. However, mustangs are the same species so they should have the ability to adapt, once adopted by humans who become their caretakers (59). In addition, Krueger and, Heinze (2008) found that horses were likely to copy behaviors of more dominant horses (439).

Initially when interacting with Cortez, I would offer him food in an effort to lure him near me. Humans use food for all sorts of rewards or mediating strange situations. I was overlooking a very important element: Cortez was not a human. If dominance is based on priority access to food, it must have been confusing why I was offering food to him. I was acting from a human perspective and not recognizing that the greeting ritual is not associated with food. You do not find one mustang offering food to another upon greeting each other for the first time.  I was approaching him like I would my domestic horses that had been trained to come into the barn using a food reward, specifically a peanut butter cookie. Once I crudely attempted to mimic the greeting displayed between the two mustangs, advancements with Cortez seemed to occur more rapidly and by the end of a year he and Bandita were transitioned into the pasture with our domestic horses without incident, greeting their new companions in the same way.

Figure 2

Anyone who has had horses for a while will recognize this greeting as typical horse behavior, but my domestic horses rarely exhibit it. What is fascinating about the situation with Cortez was his acknowledgement of my crude interpretation. As two separate species, unlike in many ways, I could not imitate him. However, much like the anthropologist learning a new language there was a brief moment of acquiesence.  I needed to recognize the unique elements and differences between greeting and feeding behavior. After a two week absence from Cortez, I will still employ this greeting if I want to halter him. However, he has also learned to respond to food rewards.

Both mustangs can now be haltered, led and ridden with a bridle and saddle. Unlike my domestic horses there is little reaction when riding to new items like garbage cans, loud noises, or situations where large farm equipment passes them in close proximity. However, Cortez will often stand still and turn looking at me on his back when encountering something out of place. Could this looking back mimic what horses do in the wild seeking guidance from the stallion found in the back of the herd for protection? Thinking back to the place where Cortez was born this makes sense. The canyon walls amplify noise and his lessened startle response may be the result of environmental conditioning absent in my domestic horses. This suggests different adaptive behaviors based on environmental context like we would expect in human cultures. This social learning suggests that there are differences of behaviors based on context. These behaviors seem to support Stone’s contention that horses “are, instead, ‘intelligent’ creatures with the ability to solve problems using classical, operant, and cognitive processes (2010, 60). The inclusion of these once free-roaming mustangs have also impacted and changed the behavior of their domestic counterparts.

Culture is Learned

Participant-observation allows for intimate understanding of a culture. It allows the anthropologist to make comparisons. Subtle changes can go unnoticed to the outsider. Having had other horses for about seven years prior to the adoption of these mustangs, a routine had emerged. My horses have always had a 40×60 shed attached to a mud lot and about four acres. They determine whether they want to be in the shed or out on pasture. There is always dry grass hay and water available in the building. Two learned behaviors emerged after contact with Cortez and Bandita.

Many times what we learn in the field as anthropologists happens by accident. The recognition that my domestic gelding had learned something new happened accidentally. Mister, my Paint gelding had come to our house when he was four years old. He had been bought as a two-year-old for a 4-H project. The original breeder felt that he was not being cared for in an appropriate manner and bought him back. He lived with other young horses on a pasture with small outbuildings that provided shelter. When Mister arrived at my farm, he was placed in a box stall adjacent to the other horses. Since he appeared timid, we did not want to immediately introduce him into the herd that had an established territory and hierarchy. In addition, he needed immunizations and other veterinary care. Unlike my other horses, he would defecate anywhere, including his hay and occasionally in the small water tank in his box stall. Since he was my primary riding horse, this simply seemed to be a burden to tolerate.

Because of an injury to another horse, we kept Mister and Cortez together in the converted calf barn, which was familiar to both horses. This area was cleaned daily when the two were turned back out on pasture. Once my other horse recovered, Mister returned to his box stall. After only a week with Cortez, Mister began to defecate in the same area, much like stud piles that are seen on the mustang ranges. After a few days of being separated, Mister reverted to his typical behavior. On several occasions I would house Cortez and Mister together and the same behavioral change would occur. Currently, after several interactions, Mister usually defecates in one area of his box stall or at the outer edges away from his hay and water. It is a close approximation of a stud pile, but not identical.  Copying behavior has been confirmed in the academic literature but, behaviors of dominant horses are usually copied (Kreuger and Heinze 2008, 431). In this particular scenario Mister had a higher status level than Cortez in the herd. There was no overt confrontation to suggest a reestablishment of dominance between the two of them or it was so subtle that I did not detect it. After observing this change, I wondered if there were other examples of social learning between the mustangs and my domestic horses.

The horses have the ability to move from pasture, mud lot and the shed most of the year. If the snow is over two feet or the pasture becomes too muddy, potentially impacting the spring growth, then the horses are restricted to the mud lot and shed. Adjacent to their mud lot and path to a larger grazing area, there is a relatively steep incline to a fence that encloses the outdoor arena. Vegetation usually grew high and needed to be mowed so not to grow into the arena. There is a flat area at the top of this relatively steep embankment, but the horses would use the flat path to the pasture area.

Last year was the first time that Cortez utilized this area. I began to notice, when using the outdoor arena, that the vegetation did not need to be cut. On several occasions, I would observe Cortez eating the vegetation on the top of this embankment where other horses had showed no interest.

The terrain between the Little Bookcliffs Wild Horse Range and our farm are quite different. None of our domestic horses have been exposed to mountains, cliffs or steep inclines. Why Cortez began to eat the grass on this incline is not known, but spatial memory may hold a clue. In the Bookcliffs it was not uncommon to graze on sharp inclines. In other words, he had learned to do this behavior since birth. It suggests, that although the same species, he conceptualized the spatial environment differently (Hothersall et al. 2010, 72). Soon Bandita, Cortez and our burro, Juanita, could be found grazing in that area. In addition, Cortez would use this area to avoid mud that may result from pooling due to a heavy thunderstorm. On the range, washouts could cause a potential hazard and his behavior reflected his prior learning. On several occasions this spring when the usual path became muddy, other horses were observed using the top of the embankment to avoid the mud. In addition, Cortez will now use the typical path used by the herd. This area, which has been available to our other horses for nearly a decade, began to be used in a new way once Cortez joined the herd.

Conclusion

The most fascinating element of field work is the constant surprises. It is never clear when studying a new culture what will become important. Studying a culture from an etic perspective gives us information, but living among those studied provides a greater appreciation and a richer understanding of those taken for granted behaviors that seem so normal. Culture is a shared process and knowing how to function in it is learned. It often requires us to question our strongly held beliefs, which we view as the correct way to live. This case study shows that social learning can occur between species.

Anthropology has had many definitions of culture seeking to emphasize the uniqueness of humans. Perhaps culture exists less in some static definition, but is revealed in relationships (Haraway 2008). Understanding culture cannot occur without interactions with the Other. After interacting with Cortez, there were times when each of us took our behavior for granted, shared an understanding, and discovered that learning can happen anywhere.

References

Bureau of Land Management. 2011. How to Adopt a Wild Horse or Burro. http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/whbprogram/adoption_program/how_to_adopt.html

Desmond, Jane. 2002. Staging Tourism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fox, Michael W. 1900. Inhumane Society. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Haraway, Donna J. 2008. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hothersall, B., E. Gale, P. Harris and C. Nicol. 2010. “Cue Use by Foals (Equus caballus) in a Discrimination Learning Task.” Animal Cognition 13: 63-74.

Kirksey, S. Eben and Stefan Helmreich. 2010. “The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography.” Cultural Anthropology 25 (4): 545-576. doi: 10.1111/j.1548-1360.2010.01069.x.

Kroeber, Alfred, and Clyde Kluckhohn. 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. New York: Vintage Books.

Krueger, Konstanze and Jürgen Heinze. 2007. “Horse sense: social status of horses (Equus caballus) affects their likelihood of copying other horses’ behavior.” Animal Cognition 11 (3): 431-439. doi: 10.1007/s10071-007-0133-0.

McDonnell, Sue. 2003. A Practical Field Guide to Horse Behavior: The Equid Ethogram. Lexington: The Blood-Horse, Inc.

McFarland, Sarah E. and Ryan Hediger. 2009. “Approaching the Agency of Other Animals: An Introduction”. In Animals and Agency, edited by Sarah E. McFarland and Ryan Hediger.

McGrew, William C. 1992. Chimpanzee Material Culture:Implications for Human Evolution. Cambridge: University Press.

Peacock, James L. 2001. The Anthropological Lens:Harsh Light, Soft Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perry, Susan. 2009. “Are Nonhuman Primates Likely to Exhibit Cultural Capacities Like Those of Humans.” In The Question of Animal Culture, by Kevin N Laland and Bennett G. Galef, 247-268. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Stone, Sherril M. 2010. “Human facial discrimination in horses: can they tell us apart?” Animal Cognition 13: 51-61. doi: 10.1007/s10071-009-0244-x

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Werhahn, Hanna, Engel F. Hessel, and Herman F.A Van den Weghe. 2012. “Competition Horses Housed in Single Stalls (II): Effects of Free Exercise on the Behavior in the Stable, the Behavior during Training, and the Degree of Stress.” Journal of Equine Veterinary Science 32(1): 22-31. doi: 10.1016/j.jevs.2011.06.009.

Wheeler, David L. 1998. “The Far Country: Wild Horses, Public Lands, and the Little Book Cliffs of Colorado.” Journal of the Western Slope 13 (1-2): 1-91.

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P. Prayer Elmo Raj, Karunya University, Coimabtore, India

Abstract

The human-animal discretion marks a noteworthy dialectic in Agamben’s philosophical corpus that connotes the conception of human’s interconnection with the animal other has established anthropological features as inherently encountering the systemic networks of power that underlies the social echelons. The incomprehensible biblical image of the righteous symbolized with animal heads after the Day of Judgement creates a plinth for Agamben to survey the manifold means in which the anthropological machine of Western intellect impact the privileging of the human over the animal. Homo Sapiens as an anthropo-sociological category is an apparatus that identifies the centrality of human beings involving a mobility that furnishes the human-human dialectic configuring the third form of life, a bare life that dismantle the machine but the neither human nor nature are allowed to subjugate the other but represent a dialectical harmony, a “dialectic at a standstill” from a Benjaminian point of view that distances the non-happenstance.

Keywords: Agamben, anthropo-sociological, human-animal, animal studies, philosophy

I

Agamben views history from a Hegelian perspective where reason expands from a philosophical stand point but clarifies those notions like human, animal, language and science as a timeless trend. Bringing in Heideggerean stance on Being and Time, he explains how the animal does undergo death as an unconstructive experience but dying does not bring into animal a death but a stoppage of life where the animal voice encompasses the death of the animal recognizes that history has to comprise the animal. Evolution, though not involved, seems subjective where the voice is mislaid when the animal dies. He constitutes a significantly convoluted theoretical ontology without being distinguishing between various forms of beings, humans-animals that are explicated in an open space that discards historical and cultural elements contributing to the making of a being through consciousness. Thus, Agamben’s version of Being is closely akin to that of Heidegger in his adherence of a possible propinquity in humans and animals.

Homo sacer becomes the parting border between humans and animals; the animal is the wolf-human where a close proximity is involved. The werewolf is closer to that of a bandit, an outlaw, in the medieval ages. Medieval law describes the bandit as posturing a wolf’s head. The bandit is one who is banned from the city and prohibited by the law. The werewolf exemplifies a form of life that correlates to that demotes to a condition prior to a principle of edict. However, bare life is neither human nor animal but the differentiation move beyond human-animal dialectic through its substantial dynamics. Animal being is exclusive of the political encompassing a sphere of apolitiy, a condition of exemption, manifesting an opposition to human dynamics and potentiality, the being that exists in zoe/bio binary. However the indifference that formulates the being of human underlines an ontological difference, a form of requirement animality positions the unfilled negativity of human. Agamben writes: “Insofar as the animal knows neither beings nor nonbeings, neither open nor closed, it is outside of being; it is outside in an exteriority more external than any open, and inside in an intimacy more internal than any closedness. To let the animal be would then mean: to let it be outside of being” (Open 91). Such exclusion marks animal by privation by which negativity is depicted within the establishment of animality.

Agamben’s anthropogenesis deferral of its disinhibitors and the animals becomes incompetent of negativity suspending the sphere of human proximity. However the animal being is seen previously as being outside of the concept of being where natural life as opposed to political life which becomes life marked with exemption. Considering the idea of animality as a perceptive of natural life Agamben’s dialectic lingers a humanist enterprise. Animal being within Agamben’s corpus emerges as an outside and the position that encourages the consequent expression of human. Outside, nevertheless, is not an essential differentiation of externality but inherent anthropogenesis where animal being is confined and ciphered within an anthropogenic course and deferred in the becoming of human as wholesome potentiality, the ability to be wearied. Heideggerean foundational ontology recognizes a link between animal and Dasein, the world-forming. Animal as dispossessed and refuted anticipates only a sense of probability of being.

Agamben’s human – animal, speaking – living being, bios – zoe presumes a fundamental unity in its essence. His notion of “bare life” that he seeks to explicate from Homo Sacer differentiates between bios from zoe, life that is general to all living beings. Agamben does not show interest to challenge or adhere with the evolution theory to promote the link between human and animal as of Aristotle or to endorse the disruption between the human and animal association like Descartes and Heidegger but brings in fresh treatment to zoe (Durantaye 333). He anticipates a rationale of ontological accord and historical advancement that intimates the present burlesques of divisions by congealing the anthropological apparatus that is threatening contemporary societies. Agamben’s The Open brings in Aristotelian notion of life designating a negative substance but encompasses the movable limits within the existence of human life. conveying the concept of life beyond the classical philosophy, he designates a humanisitic perspective but entailing the futures of the human but that which lacks in the animal. The human-animal is a same fold entity as they are “the jewel set at the centre” (Open 68). The ability to differentiate human from animal lies in the potential to dangle the animal captivation permitting freedom. The life lays in freedom from a reincorporating life and not through diminishing the dichotomy. Therefore the uniqueness of humanity comes from the Heideggarean zone of irresolvement through which the animal and the human are harmoniously accorded and distinguished through the relation between confinements. As Lewis maintains: “Unlike the human world with its potentiality for uniqueness and authentic responses to particular situations, the animal environment is closed to the openness of being, producing a state of captivation or predetermined behavioural reflexes to fixed stimuli” (n.pag). The biopolitical condition of zoe provides certain segregate realm of the sovereign as the citizen moves into bios for its political mode. The manner of lie that pre-empts certain universal living being is the subject of politics making dignity as part of modern discourse. Agamben brings to our notice the resentments and uncertainties of clarifying human in relation to animal being. ‘Life’ in Aristotle’s De Anima entails an exclusivity of nutritive life from which the order of life is systematized giving way to the probability of a dichotomy between the higher and lower faculty of life scheduling an aporetic relationship between human and animal being.

Bare life entails sovereignty constituting life “included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed” (Open 85). Therefore biopolitical validations become indissoluble from autonomous power because the configuration of the political realm involves the constitution of life. Anthropogenesis is a coercion that excludes the originary to make the possibility of a Dasein. It is through this conduit and disclosure of the probability of moment the departure of animality ensues in a human being. However it also makes us think if Agamben’s differentiation between human and animal appeals a segregate of “indistinction” between human and animal (LaCapra 166). The undisputed presumption is that a being is the derivation of the openness due to a human being exists as an ontic essence that is consequently inherent and coetaneous with being. The animal captivation that points to an openness of the probability in Dasein is a strength that deals with the authentic captivating supremacy of the animal’s environment to be triggered. Therefore, it allows us to inform the nontruth that is analogous to the originality of truth, the undisclosed center of truth as aletheia is a timeless encounter between openness and veil which characterizes the human world. Agamben attempts to consider “animal life insofar as he locates the problem of animal being as that of living being, zoe, in the direction of the human, a development that is not supported by Heidegger’s analyses of animality from which Agamben claims to have derived his assertions” (Gustafson 13). The metaphysical medium that forms the kernel giving rise to the idea of human as a strained interconnection between animal and human existence.

II

The “anthropological machine,” that connotes with the craft of human being and the innate instinct to counter systemic execution of power at various levels and forms that pursue to oppress, consociates with Focault’s critical-intellectual encounter with power and the haphazard of biopolitics. The biopolitical machine attempts to elucidate the human in its alliance to the animal from a bare life perspective. Durantaye observes that “It is this menace, which the work of Foucault helped to move to the centre of Agamben’s interests, that leads Agamben to undertake an investigation of the reigning conceptions of life—and of the way human life is distinguished from animal life, the way qualified, categorized life is distinguished from a merely animalic life, a “bare” and “unprotected” life” (Durantaye 334). In order to impede the tackle that administers the idea of human is to dependably exhibit the key emptiness and gap that distinguishes the human from the animal. Therefore it is not the human or animal but from “open space between the two” becomes the key to the sustenance of the society. The inherent self-identifying notion of anthropological machine imports the idea that some of the animals are distinguished within the category of humans in opposition to another category named animals. Anthropological machine as a systemic category analyzes and explicates each other exclusively:

Insofar as the production of human through the opposition human/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine necessarily functions by means of exclusion (which is always already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also always already an exclusion). Indeed, precisely because the huhuman is already presupposed every time, the machine actually produces a kind of state of exception, a zone of indeterminacy in which the outside nothing but the exclusion of an inside and the inside is in turn only the inclusion of an outside. (Open 37)

The anthropological machine dominates our perspective of human through an immediate enunciation of the animal and the human though the idea predicates upon a link between the two. Agamben’s contribution to biopolitics is the legitimacy he endorses to the interconnection of politics to violence and the interconnection between human and the non-human animal life, the base for any activity. Agamben maintains that “In our culture, the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of human. That is to say, in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics” (Open 80).  Agamben’s view is close to Foucault’s statement “modern human is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (143). However, in Agamben the dispute between human and animal should form as the base for biopolitics as a formative distinction. The positioning of life within sovereignty constitutes the life as distinguished from a life constituted by law or divinity. The association between human and animal is historical and an altered method of fabrication comes to pass in the modern period eliminating the self-being through animalizing the human and by prohibiting the non-human in the being. The anthropological machine schedules “the non-human produced within the human” (Open 37) because it functions in a proportioned manner where “the inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-human is produced by the humanization of the animal” (Open 37). The humanization of animal proliferates in the configuration of oppression that produces colonies and slaves making their affinity to animal legitimized. Agamben writes, “If there is no animal politics, that is perhaps because animals are always already in the open and do not try to take possession of their own exposition; they simply live in it without caring about it. That is why they are not interested in mirrors, in the image as image” (Means 92.3). Human beings disconnect images from objects and christen them as they identify themselves to take control of their own appearance. Thus, they alter the open into a world full of political encounters and struggle whose object is truth, the name of that truth is History.

The Open discusses primarily about the anthropological machine that impact humanized animal and the animalized human pre-dating the modern forms of being. The historicity of language is influenced by the anthropological machine aiding humans to renovate the faculty to decide. The interconnection between human beings and animals fabricate itself a different form when diminishes into bare life where the anthropological machine delivers inoperative. The barrenness and the gap within human being differentiate human and animal to menace the being into such barrenness. Agamben’s re-narration of infantile dynamics in animals emphasizes a fresh relation between human beings and animals through experience of language. Agamben brings in the example of axolotl, a Mexican freshwater amphibian to establish its neoteny. Axolotl preserves its juvenile gills all through its maturation instead of shedding its juvenile features to grow adult features. Humans, according to Agamben, evolve from a young primate with early reproductive faculty. As a result, the temporary features in primates become perfect in flesh and bone, the category of the eternal child. The eternal child is disposed of its state of infancy declining any destiny but with potentiatlities that is autonomous, alive and being.  Agamben’s presentation of axolotl is inquisitive that reflect and consolidate the infantile dynamics autonomously re-narrating the premature experiences of language. The altering relationship between human and animals is anticipated to concentrate on the susceptible reliant on the perilous interconnections of the experiences of language. The “ape-human” is located at a stage of huhuman that heralds language that is natural and essential without which huhuman “neither truly exist nor be thought of as existing. Either human has language, or he simply is not” (Open  36). The naturality of human soul is lost as it presumes an inference from the previous stages. Consequently, it is not the human alone; the animal also advances through language from animality to humanity. Evolutionary theory fails to underline the capacity of speech as a link between animals and humans. The differentiation between animals and humans, for Agamben, is language which informs an innate advanced psychophysical configuration in human beings. However, he discards the anthropological machine attributing language as a unique human capacity.

The detachment between language and speech becomes the prerequisite for the historicity of humans whereas “animals do not enter language, they are already inside it” but human “splits this single language and, in order to speak, has to constitute himself as the subject of language” (Infancy 59). It suggests that “if human is the animal that has become bored and becomes a speaking being, this specific “becoming” that Agamben designates as anthropogenesis must itself derive from something which both exceeds and is more originary than these conceptual doubles—more orignary realm that the human is capable of interrupting or suspending” (Gustafson 10). The animal voice is expanded to inform the language of human where the truth is expressed through objects and the ability of language of human beings as opposed to animals demonstrates the ontological aspect. As Hegarty observes the voice, as explained by Agamben, is “not the human discursive voice, but the voice that lies between animal voice and discourse; it is ‘no longer the experience of sound, and not yet the experience of meaning’” (17).

The animal that seems not to be burdened by any particular trait experiences the social. Language/voice is key to Agamben’s understanding of socio-polity where the process of signification and other procedures of language production come into play. The paradoxical space that the animal occupies presents the impact of philosophy and religion that offers human being an indeterminate feature of humanity. The splintered nature of human is recognized as animal where the presumption of severance conveyed into human culture covering in the form of biopolitics and dogmas. If humanity is discussed from a perspective of non-language, the particularity of extermination of humanity in the veiling of language and the replacement by simulation could be compared to animals. Therefore, humanity as described from the perspective of a non-language, for Hegel is an exchange of apotheosis but Agamben insists on the individuality and the probability that underlines the continuation of language. Thus, “human is the only animal with discursive language, echoing the self-reflexivity or awareness that only it has, and the essence of that is the transition where language is nothing, where the threat of death is all” (Hegarty 19). The demarcation between Agamben’s huhuman-animal by a default encounter with language is contemplatively legitimizing a distinction formed on the nonhuhuman within the huhuman.

Only the word puts us in contact with mute things. While nature and animals are forever caught up in a language, incessantly speaking and responding to signs even while keeping silent, only human succeeds in interrupting, in the word, the infinite language of nature and placing himself for a moment in front of mute things. The inviolate rose, the idea of rose, exists only for human. (Idea of Prose 113)

Agamben differs with the classical notion that it is the ability of human beings to use the language makes then exceptional from that of animals. It is the capacity of human beings to make language perceptible that is unique. The faculty to segregate the language of nature from the object, the mute object permits human beings to develop into object-orientation, or the Heideggerean ‘world-forming.’ Consequently, animals do not evolve into world-forming beings because they are inoperative of the nature that isolates the construction of nature.

Agamben suggests that within the profound boredom we distinguish the propinquity that characterizes animal essence and the moment of boredom is the moment that exposes animal captivation. Captivation is not a condition where the substance of the being is revealed but the affinity of the substance is convoluted bringing in certainty in freedom beyond rationale. The deficiencies of the world the animal experiences is the unresponsiveness involving the mobility from the animal to the human not as an appendage but as a process that is started towards the temporal. Agamben explains: “In captivation the animal was in an immediate relation with its disinhibitor, exposed to and stunned by it, yet in such a way that the disinhibitor could never be revealed as such. What the animal is precisely unable to do is suspend and deactivate its relationship with the ring of its specific disinhibitors. That animal environment is constituted in such a way that something like a pure possibility can never manifest within it” (Open 68). The animal is able to perform in response to particular stimuli during captivation and the animal survives as a dynamic entity in an ambience to differentiate itself from human beings through a sublime reestablishment. The dynamics that exist within living beings can evoke a mobility whereby the animals invoke its own impotentiality setting the standard of gauging the potentiality of the human becomes dependent on the chasm of human impotentiality. Thus as Lewis notes it is “the animal that enables our potential-to-be, and it is the human that enables our potential-not-to-be: thus the site of indistinction between the two is precisely the location of potentiality itself (as both the capability to be and not to be simultaneously)” (n.pag). When the animal responds to the stimuli of its existing ambience and the human to the world, the void sets up the dynamics of potentiatlity where the operative frees itself to exist between the ability and incapacity become identical.

Agamben’s idea of animal being follows Heidegger’s scheme of animal life through a critique of the supposed ontological superiority of Being in boredom where the affinity of human to animal is explicated. In Heideggerean view point the animal is isolated within the sphere of disinhibitors consistent with the environment of the conscious world. Captivation is presented as the method of imbibing the fundamentality of animal being. The animal is entranced by its disinhibitor whereby the animal acts itself to respond to the stimuli (behaviour). Agamben, however, views that the being is commenced negatively into animal environment by a denial which is ambiguous. Thus “the essence of the animal’s relation to world is not simply that of pure deprivation, but simultaneously one of lack, an assertion that rests on the concept of animal captivation” (Gustafson 6). Captivation fetches the substance of the animal being from an essential openness and soaked up by an ambience that denies. Such a opportunity of being involves a disinhibition that is evident in the animal causing a interruption into the substance of the animal. Captivation is not “a sort of fundamental Stimmung  in which the animal does not open itself, as does Dasein, in a world, yet is nevertheless ecstatically drawn outside of itself in an exposure which disrupts it in its every fiber” (Open 62). Thus the human world is understood solely through an interconnection to the revelation with openness that embodies animal being. The openness of the human world can be sought by a manoeuvre that relates the animal world, the profound boredom that a human being’s basic regulatory mechanism that congregates upon animal captivation.

Dasein, as Agamben views, is distributed to that which denies itself as of animal in its captivation where the refusal of the totality is configuratively into a world of its concern and unrevealed. Moreover the animal is incapable of postponing and disengaging its interconnection with the sphere of its disinhibitors and hence profound boredom manifests as a metaphysical operative where the “passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to human world, is realized; at issue here is nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming Da-sein of living human” (Open 68). Agamben traces the link between human and animal from an entangled encounter between unconcealedness and concealedness, the Heideggerean world where the domestic struggle between human and animal is located. Cosequently Dasein is merely an animal that has trained to be bored and stimulated ‘from’ its own captivation ‘to’ its captivation. This initiation of the living being to its ‘own being-captivated’ to be the human. The impact of world is scrutinized from becoming-human that relies on the captivation of animal being. Captivation as the means of link with its ambience is corresponds to an open-close access to being. Agamben’s reading of boredom through Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics discloses the affinity between Dasein and the animal. Dasein rivets autonomy similar to that of animal captivation with a possibility in boredom. Thus profound boredom acting as a metaphysical operator offers a passage from animality to humanity through what Agamben defines as the “becoming Da-sein of the living human.” The becoming Da-sein occurs through an Heideggerean inclusive exclusion that veils the animal other in the core of Dasein predicating upon an open human-animal dialectic.

 Works Cited

Agamben, Giorgio. Infancy and History. Trans. Liz Heron. London; New York: Verso, 2007.  Print.

—. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. Print.

—. Means Without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino.   Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 2000. Print.

—.  Idea of Prose. Trans. M. Sullivan and S. Whitsitt. Albany.  NY: State U of New York P, 1995.   Print.

Durantaye, Leland Del la. Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction. Stanford: Stanford UP,  2009.   Print.

Gustafsson, Simone. ““Outside of Being”: Animal Being in Agamben’s Reading of  Heidegger.” Colloquy: Text Theory Critique. 25(2013). 1-20. Print.

Hegarty, Paul. “Giorgio Agamben.” From Agamben to Zizek: Contemporary Critical Theorists. Ed. Jon Simons.  Edinburg: Edinburgh UP, 2010. Print.

LaCapra, Dominick. History and Its Limits: Huhuman, Animal, Violence. Ithaca; London:  Cornell UP, 2009. Print.

Lewis, Tyson E. On Study: Giorgio Agamben and Educational Potentiality. NY: Routledge,    2013.   Print.

P. Prayer Elmo Raj, Asst. Prof. of English, Karunya University, Coimabtore

Stella Hockenhull, University of Wolverhampton, UK.

Abstract

In 2011, Uggie the dog appeared in Hazanavicius’s 2011 film, The Artist. This was not his first role having appeared beforehand in Lawrence’s adaptation of the novel Water for Elephants also 2011 where he is also listed as cast, and as a skateboarding dog in an advert, amongst his many other appearances. However, the success and press coverage of the film resulted in huge acclaim for its canine star: Uggie received a special mention for his performance at the Prix Lumière Awards in France, won the Palm Dog Award at the 2011 Cannes Film Festival and the golden collar award in LA. Fans mounted a campaign to have the dog nominated for an Acting Academy Award in his own right, but he was not eligible – the award only appropriate for humans. Also, in recognition for his part, Uggie shared the prize for the best canine performance awarded by The Seattle Times, along with Cosmo, the canine character in Beginners (Mills 2010). More recently, Uggie has sunk his paws into the cement outside Grauman’s Chinese theatre in LA and has ‘written’ an autobiography, his thoughts channelled by his owner via Wendy Holden who stated “I thought this was one Hollywood star I really wanted to write about” (Independent online). Thus, Uggie might be perceived as a star persona through various accolades, is accorded this status by the press and the industry, and arguably he also produces a stellar performance; indeed his ‘acting’ was described by critics as “the best performance, human or animal, in any film I’ve seen this year”. Drawing on existing debates in star theory and performance studies, this essay examines Uggie as star persona in The Artist.

Keywords: The Artist, Performance Theory, Star Theory

At the outset of Michel Hazanavicius’s 2011 film, The Artist, the central character, George Valentin (Jean Dujardin), takes a bow on stage and makes a show of introducing his dog, Jack (Uggie), to the amused and effusive applauding audience. It is at this juncture that Uggie executes a succession of tricks, such as walking on his hind legs with front legs aloft, gazing at his ‘owner’, begging while seated on his haunches, and finally playing dead. He remains lying down in the same position for some time, while George introduces his female human co-star. Through a succession of shots, the animal is presented as a cute and expressive character, alluring his audience while also fulfilling a narrative role. Here, Uggie isn’t behaving as himself; rather he is performing a character, demonstrating individual traits which might be perceived by audiences in human terms as cleverness, loyalty, thoughtfulness, quaintness and charm. His behaviour is displayed through a repertoire of performance signs and the presentation is perceived through a range of movements, actions and expressions despite, and also through the deployment of the film language.

Uggie has become a star in his own right and this is not only evident through his various accolades and awards, but also through his performances across a variety of films. The central concept of this essay is that, in a similar vein to human film stars, non human animals are equally significant and occupy a comparable space in the public eye – both on and off screen. It offers the model of animal as star character within the theoretical frameworks of Star Studies and Performance Studies, a notion not only evident through publicity and promotion, but also through a repertoire of legible performance signs discernible across a body of films. Using The Artist as a case study, the first section briefly examines the legitimacy of animal as actor and performer, and as star persona through publicity, promotion and marketing; the second part analyses Uggie’s performance in The Artist.

Invariably, the analysis of animals has suggested that they be perceived as ‘other’, and non cognisant and this has precluded the examination of the animal as star. In her seminal work on child performance, Karen Lury notes that animals, in a similar vein to children, are often only perceived as performers in relation to adult presentations. Lury observes the correlation between the child actor and the animal, noting that a perception exists that neither act in the true sense of the word, and their purpose is to operate “as the ground for the proper performance of the adult” (2010: 11). Further, she argues that the adult performance is frequently perceived as producing a “subjectivity that is self-conscious, coherent and legible, in contrast to the unconsciousness, incoherence and illegibility of the ‘something else’ that is manifested by the animal and in the child” (Lury 2010: 11). Lury’s work inverts the notion of the child as ‘something else’ whereby she constructs an argument that the child is capable of a transition in performance to attain, what she terms, ‘humanness’, an evolutionary process into an adult performance which then makes its actions appear conscious, coherent and legible.

In a similar vein, and to adopt Lury’s theory, animals might also be perceived as capable of transition to attain not ‘humanness’, but ‘animalness’, or, what Anat Pick terms ‘creatureliness’ (2011a). In cinema, the viewer is offered a specific perspective, and therefore frequently provided an anthropomorphic treatment produced through the language of the film such as editing and cinematography.[1] However, Pick’s concept reflects the collapse of human/animal binaries, thus minimising the barriers between the two in order to uncover their commonality. Her reasoning for this is derived from an ethical standpoint based on the notion that all creatures are vulnerable and face “a common embodiment and mortality [which] is primarily the condition of exposure and finitude that affects all living bodies whatever they are” (Pick 2011b). Pick argues that animals might also possess psychological traits, albeit one of psychology’s narcissistic tendencies is to assume that this occurs in human mode, and she promotes an understanding of animal behaviour wrought from non linguistic communication, an ability unconfined to, yet most noticeable in primates.[2] Thus, although it is not possible to know what an animal thinks or feels, for Pick it is feasible to read gestures and signs through the process of observation of animal behaviour.

Star theory offers an intervention for the study of animals onscreen. Not only has it constituted a distinctive strand of Film Studies since the 1970s and includes performance studies, but has wholly centred on humans rather than animals. Scholarly works by Richard Dyer (1979) focused on Hollywood stardom through detailed scrutiny of celebrity screen performances, and use of archival materials. Since Dyer, two alternative approaches have developed: audience engagement with stars and the industrial context of stardom (Gledhill 1991, Staiger 1992, Stacey 1994). Whether the studies are Eurocentric, Hollywood specific, Bollywood or based on an identifiable star, there has been no inclusion of animals in this large repertoire to date. While animals such as Trigger, the horse in the Roy Rogers films of the 1940s, have been perceived as stars through their various guest appearances, accolades and awards, they have not formed the subject for discussion in terms of Star theory.

Nonetheless, if the promotion, publicity, industry considerations and audience engagement is used as a theoretical framework to study the human star, so might this be applied to the non human animal. The success and press coverage of The Artist resulted in huge acclaim for its canine star and Uggie received a special mention for his performance at the Prix Lumière Awards in France, won the ‘Palm Dog’ Award at the 2011 Cannes Film Festival and the golden collar award in Los Angeles. Fans mounted a campaign to have the dog nominated for an Acting Academy Award in his own right, but he was not eligible – the award deemed appropriate only for humans. Also, in recognition for his part, Uggie shared the prize for the best canine performance awarded by The Seattle Times, along with Cosmo, the canine character in Beginners (Mills 2010). More recently, Uggie has sunk his paws into the cement outside Grauman’s Chinese theatre in LA and has ‘written’ an autobiography, his thoughts channelled by his owner Von Muller via writer, Wendy Holden, who stated: “I thought this was one Hollywood star I really wanted to write about” (in Williams 2012). Uggie’s appearance in Hazanavicius’s 2011 silent film was not his first part, the dog having appeared beforehand in minor parts in films such as What’s Up Scarlett (Caldarella 2005), and Wassup Rockers (Clark 2005). His major roles where he is listed as cast include Mr Fix It (Ferriola 2006), and Francis Lawrence’s adaptation of the novel Water for Elephants 2011 in the role of a bitch named Queenie. He has also made numerous other appearances in television, for example as a skateboarding dog in various adverts and as a special guest on chat shows. Although Uggie has retired, arguably he is now a celebrity in his own right, a status acquired through the various tributes accorded by the press, the public and the industry.

Just as critics invariably pore over a human star’s acting, minutely scrutinising their gestures and mannerisms, so animal performance might also be examined in this way. Performance is also a measure of stardom[3] and although this is more problematic to address when thinking about animal presentation, it is possible to focus on this aspect across a body of films. Admittedly, we cannot know what an animal thinks or feels, or whether the performance is undertaken in a cognisant or mindful way. Nonetheless, it is legible for the spectator who perceives the animal’s actions, expressions and movement within the context of the narrative. Therefore, using close textual analysis of an animal’s performance across a range of films it is feasible to focus on animal ‘acting’ using a similar theoretical framework to that applied to human performances. Furthermore, the trainer frames the performance for the spectator to ensure that it is perceived within the correct context, and finally the animal operates within its own socio-biological patterning to produce what is ‘dog’ about its performance.

As noted above, Uggie is the recipient of many accolades associated with Hollywood stardom, and he has appeared in a succession of films which, if adhering to a Star Studies’ analysis, also enables a close scrutiny of elements of continuity in his performance style – a much neglected arena in this field of study.[4] The notion that animals perform is a contested area, yet, arguably, animal behaviour and appearance onscreen must be understood in terms of what Richard Schechner (2002) alludes to as ‘as’ performance rather than as star exhibition, or manipulated through the film language or merely living in front of the camera. In some situations the animal’s behaviour might not necessarily appear intentional or obvious, leaving only its presence onscreen, and the director’s subsequent manipulation of this through the language of film, open to analysis. This is a point of entry that Brenda Austin-Smith notes, particularly in relation to the performance of the donkey in Robert Bresson’s Au Hasard Balthazar (1966). As she states, the animal “acts like a donkey … whose performance choices are made for him by the filmmaker” (Austin-Smith 2012: 29). Furthermore she argues that the donkey’s performance can be understood not necessarily as intentional, but “as a character who can be fully known by what he shows to us, having no choice but to show us all that he is … Balthazar’s twitching ears and wide eyes … likewise credit him with curiosity and wonder, making him more than a walking symbol of suffering” (Austin-Smith 2012: 31). Consequently, according to Austin-Smith, Balthazar’s performance can be understood through a form of non linguistic communication or, what Anat Pick (2011) might term, his own ‘creatureliness’: practices, behaviour and movement consonant with those of his own species.

That Uggie communicates non linguistically in a canine manner akin to his own genus is incontestable, yet, in connection with this genetic programming which can be read as performance, his routine is also manipulated to present supplementary significances through the process of training. Through specific guidance Uggie also produces a believable and legible performance for the spectator.

Uggie’s acts in the above named films are not performed without interventions and just as the actor reads and interprets their lines of dialogue and the directions from the screenplay so does the animal – through an interpreter (the trainer). Whereas the animal does not make a choice in the same way as a human being through a thinking/discussion process, its actions invariably involve choice and negotiation. Albeit the animal’s autonomy, as Austin-Smith suggests, ‘shows us all that he is’, its performance is also framed for us, not only through the specificity of the film language, but also by the trainer. Paul Bouissac, a scholar and academic who has written extensively on the semiotics of circus performance suggests that animal performance takes place in response to a trainer who ‘frames’ it as a presentation. He notes that, in terms of circus routines,

by thus manipulating both the animal’s behaviour and the context of this behaviour the trainer utilizes, at the same time, two different semiotic systems. As a result, such manipulation generates for the public, and to a lesser extent for the trainer, the illusion that the relevant context is the one they perceive and that the animals share this perception of the situation that is constructed in the ring” (Bouissac 1981: 19).

In Uggie’s performance, Sarah Clifford, Uggie’s trainer, states that the scenes were challenging and she explains how she choreographed and ‘framed’ these presentations, commenting on the aforementioned sequence thus:

As a trainer, I had to be far away, tucked back behind the curtain. Jean had to work Uggie on his own while acting and hitting his own marks. It’s a long scene to have a dog do multiple times and land on the same mark from multiple angles, but Uggie almost always nailed it, because we practiced [sic] the heck out of that scene. Dogs need to rehearse (we call it prep) scenes, just as actors need to memorize their lines (Clifford).

Bouissac suggests that circus presentations are a bi-lateral process and that the art of training creates an illusion akin to performance: as he contends,

[p]erforming animal acts are indeed patterned events that are two-sided. On the one hand, the trainers interact with their charges on the basis of their socio-biological competence, on the other hand they frame these interactions in particular situations relevant to the system of social interactions shared by the public for which they perform (Bouissac 1981: 19).

However, as Bouissac suggests the animal must also operate within its own innate genetic and biological determinants of survival, reproduction etc. As he maintains,

the trainer can elicit at will some segments of behavior and frame them in a situation of his/her choice, but the animal’s behavior is never performed out of its own socio-biological context, which transcends the trainer’s understanding of the animal’s performance …[i]n addition to the situation constructed for the audience and the one perceived and manipulated by the trainer interacting with the animals, there exists … a situation that is experienced and negotiated by the animals within their own semiotic system, i.e., the system provided by the structure and programs of their brain” (Bouissac 1981: 23-24).

Bouissac argues that the animal must also possess a level of competence which is based on their innate genetic programming.

Towards the end of The Artist George is forced to sell all his possessions and live in a small apartment. In a drunken rage he sets fire to his entire film collection and, as smoke engulfs the room, the camera cuts to a close-up shot of Uggie seated in his basket. The circumstances are that Uggie must save his master by attracting outside attention. As though realising the danger, the dog races from the house and from a rear view shot, he is seen running speedily along a walkway, darting between various different startled onlookers. Halting at the side of a policeman, the dog, framed in close-up, barks while gazing upwards; the policeman, however, remains impassive. A medium shot reveals the two side by side, the policeman expressionless and immobile, and Uggie seated, but head directed upwards and towards the man as though listening. This creates an interaction between them as, to the right of the frame, a woman observes them. At one point the policeman, becoming agitated with what appears to be the animal’s strange and inexplicable behaviour, motions him to stop barking. Uggie lies down on the pavement in an act of submission. Having witnessed George’s predicament, the spectator understands from this that the dog is trying to tell the policeman something, and urged by the bystander to follow, the policeman chases after the animal, finally reaching and rescuing George from the burning house. He is dragged outside and, at this point the dog nuzzles his face as though to revive his master. As the trainer explains:

We shot the fire scene over many days in a few different locations. I worked all the exterior scenes because Omar [Uggie’s owner] was out of the country during that time. To get Uggie to go to the cop and really evoke that frantic energy, I had to be super exuberant and really keep my energy at a 10 at all times. We shot the pant-leg part and the play-dead part in a few pieces, and each time, I would pattern him. When he ran into the smoky house, I was inside calling him as loud as I could and squeezing squeaky toys. I grabbed him just before the cop came charging through because the smoke was so thick that he couldn’t see either. It was challenging (Clifford 2012).

‘Playing dead’ is an act of repetitious activity that Uggie performs throughout the film and, whether undertaken in a cognisant manner or not, spectator understanding is activated through the animal’s gestures and physical movements. Similarly, this act is one of submission in dogs and is a natural response. Writing in 1999, Clinton Sanders suggests that interaction between people and animals is based on communicative acts. As he suggests, the actors are aware of the “purpose of the exchange – each actor is aware of his or her definition of the situation and goals to the other” (Sanders 1999: 140).  In this sequence, both ‘actors’ and trainer are aware of the principles behind the altercation, even though the dog cannot think logistically or in human terms. Even so, he operates with creaturely intention, objectives and targets thus aiming to gratify, and his presentation accordingly constitutes a performance.

This is shown when later, George awakens from a coma to find himself in his old home, and the dog ‘alerts’ him to the contents of a room by barking. In the ensuing last few moments the distraught man places a gun in his mouth, and images of his distressed face are intercut with shots of Uggie barking at his owner. However, George does not yield to suicide although he unintentionally fires a bullet to the floor. At this point, Uggie plays dead at the sound of the blast.  This occurs as the animal, seated on his haunches, gazes at the camera, and twists to one side before falling to the floor where he remains inert – this indicates canine submission which also forms part of the dog’s gamut of social behaviour.[5] Thus, spectator understanding has been enabled through the set of circumstances, the problem to be overcome, the actions taken by Uggie to achieve the objective and the tactics or beats involved in the process.

If it is problematic to understand animal performance as a cognisant activity, then it is not difficult to accept the animal’s presence as star through the various publicity, promotional materials and, above all, his performance. Although film language encourages an anthropomorphic reading, an understanding of Uggie’s presentation is not only enabled through the film language, but also through behaviour, figure expression and movement and within his own genetic programming wrought from non linguistic communication. We can perceive signs through his gestures and his movements, both scripted and interpreted by the trainer, and non scripted, to credit him with recognisable characteristics.  As Austin-Smith might argue, just because Uggie is animal, he is no less knowable.

Eunice E.OMONZEJIE, Ambrose Alli University, Nigeria

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Abstract

In African human societies, animals as part of the physical environment play an important role in the conceptualization of spirituality and belief systems.  The manner in which they are depicted in narrative fiction often reflects the attitude of a people about animals embedded in their religion, cultureand life philosophies.  My study sought to explore the representation of animals in African prose fiction of French expression, focusing on Alain Mabanckou’s novel Mémoires de porc-épic(2006). The novel redirects the reader’s vision of nature,some types of animals and culture especially as it pertains to the spiritual double. It influences the way we view animals as harbingers of evil by depicting them as being under the total control of man executing his nefarious desires. I also examined the philosophical views that informedMabanckou’s manner of animal presentation.Methodologically, I have aptly applied to this research the literary theory of zoocriticismbeing that aspect of literary criticism which is concerned with animal representation, animal subjectivity and animal rights. My analysis revealedMabanckouas an ecocritical novelist who employs his narrative skills to arguefor the preservation of interconnected affiliations of all creatures and the earth.

Keywords: Animals, zoocriticism, affiliations, humans, earth, Mémoires de porc-épic

[A]nimals have been worshipped as gods, reviled as evil spirits, endowed with souls, orregarded as mindless machines. They have been killed for food with careful respect butalso slaughtered for sport. Whilst some species have been objects of terror or loathing, others have been taken into our homes and treated as if human themselves.                   .                                             (Manning and Serpell, 1994: xi).

 Introduction

All through the centuries, animals have featured prominentlyin oral and written literatures ofall human cultures. They have been depicted as being cognisant of their situation within human cultural structures. In the various genera of narrative prose fiction, they have embodied various human and godly qualities and employed to impartreligious and ethical lessons. Animal representation in literature reflects as well on the manner in which the real animals are perceived within a cultural community. As Wendy Woodward (2003) appositely upholds, animal representation in texts impacts directly or obliquely on animals themselves and resonates ethically (15). With her sustained appreciation of the ethical repercussions of literary representation within a culture, Woodward (2008) later insists that “[t]he way that an animal is represented and constructed discursively has […] an interrelationship with the way that culture responds to the real animal” (15).For as animal studies become a potential force of enlightenment and change in public attitudes and behaviors toward animals,an increasing number of animal characters enter into African prose narrative.

In eraspast, the prevalence of animals in African oral traditions has been a prop of expression – surviving in songs, proverbs, riddles, adages and folktales. They have long being popular components of moral tales – acting as a model for humans to draw “moral lessons from the observation of animals” (Doudoroff, 273). In fables, they have been represented as examples of moral standards of behavior for humans toemulate or shun.In satire, they have been used to reflect human eccentricities, destructiveness and political ineptitudeswith the aim to ridicule. Specifically, as scholars and transcribers attest, the animal trickster protagonist as an integral part of African oral tradition, is an oftenhumorous figure of mischievous disruption, who through cunning creates many features of the natural world such as the moon and stars, hills and rivers as well as physical traits of animals (the craggy nature of the tortoise’ shell, the size of the elephant’s tusks, the length of the giraffe’s neck, the blackness of the dog’s nose, etc.).

In recent times within thenewly emerged disciplines of Ecocriticismand Zoocriticism, animals have functioned as polemic agents debating the parameters of the human category and the connectedness between humans and animals (Finnegan, Courlander, Shueib, Hamilton).My study would be theoretically anchored on the context of zoocriticism especially as defined by Huggan and Tiffin (18), to refer to thepractice of animal studies in literary studies which focuses on animal representation, animalsubjectivity, and animal rights.Animal studies scrutinise how the distinctiveness of human lives, identities and histories are inseparably tied to other sentient, intelligent, communicative and cultured beings.It means turning the animal gaze back unto the humans. Animal studies also interrogates man’s subjugation, domination and exploitation of animals – underlining some philosophers’ assertion that  animals exist for the sake of humans; for their use as food and “other accessories of life” (Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 206). Zoocritics oppose this anthropocentric view of nature or “speciesism” (Singer) which endorses the supremacy of man over nature and his right to exploit it for his own ends.

Thus, within the context of zoocriticism, this essay seeks to analyse and critique the various ways in which animals are represented in Alain Mabanckou’sanimal novel Mémoires de porc-épicthroughwhich non-human life forms are valorised in the author’s vision of his society specifically and the black African ecological structure in general. I would further explore the writer’s attitudetoanimals, such asit emerges through the various depictions of nature in the narrative, thereby redirecting our thinking of the human category.

Across African societies, various traditional concepts of spirituality involving animal life forms are greatly similar. African peoples believe that their lives are directly connected to and narrowly reliant on the flukes and fortunes of non-human forms (animal and vegetation). They believe that a shared sacredness connects animals and humans. Part ofthe common cultural knowledge of African spirituality, is the conceptionof some animals as the messengers humans use to carry out their evil deeds while some other creatures are believed to be avatars of humans. Some others stillsuch as the owl and the catare believed to be executors of malevolent deeds and harbingers of evil events. . The belief in the existence of a “double” or an alter-ego exists in most traditional cultures of Africa. In Nigeria and some other parts of West Africa, the term describes one’s spiritual double. To this double is attributed the control of one’s destiny and absorbent of unnamable portended evil.

It should be noted that in other cultural systems of the world, similar beliefs are perpetrated. According to Gossen, Mesoamericans also believe in a “private spiritual world of self that is expressed through the concept of animal souls or other extrasomatic causal forces that influence their destiny” (1994, 555). Gossen (1996) further stated that this belief is underscored by “the predestination and life history of the self that lies outside the self and is thus not subject to individual control” (83). Mabanckou’s play on this individual capacity for self-control would be analysed later.

At this point, one must make reference to the Congolese cultural inferences which serve as the framework of the narration of Mémoires de porc-épic and being the ethnical origin of Alain Mabanckou. At the core of the Congolese indigenous belief system, there exists a valorisation of non-human life forms which constitute the embodiment of the metaphysical ties between humans and animals and between both of them and nature. The Congolese spiritual concept of souls accepts that a person is explicitly connected to an external animal counterpart or co-essence. They correspondingly believe that their ancestors “could gather the power of animals into their hands … whenever they needed…” (Janzen and MacGaffey, 55).

In Mémoires de porc-épic, the Congolese author Alain Mabanckou employs an animal narrator-protagonist to make statements about human-animal categorisation and essence. Consequently, from its study of human behavior, the porcupinepasses laid-back judgmental comments on people,which reminds the wo/man of her/his follies and foibles as a human being. Through narrative imagery, the author reverses the normative human characteristics choosing to bestialisehumans and humaniseanimals.Mémoires de porc-épictakes us ona literary journey populated by animals, humans, plants, words and images.The novelreflects the values and beliefs of African people which constitute their everyday life. Specifically, it is the concept of an animal “double” self that comes into play.

In Mémoires de porc-épic a definite consciousness of animal life-forms pervades the narration. The author uses the porcupine not only in a naturalistic mode “in a fairly straightforward way and figure as part of the narrative situation and environment” (Soper 303), but also in a compassionate mode, to influence the reader’s empathy with the animal narrator.

Human and Non-Human Spiritual Connectedness

The narration of Mabanckou’s novelMémoires de porc-épicis centered upon the beliefthat a shared sacredness connects non-human life-forms to human life. It testifies to a type of co-existence and interdependence between humansand animals, and between nature and other life-forms. It firstcalls attention to the spiritual conditions prevalent in the culturescape of a traditional Congolese village, where animals arebelieved to have metaphysicalbonds withhumans.There exists an acknowledgement of the centrality of animals in human life, being a potent life-force without which the humans would cease to exist. In the novel, the association of animals with sorcery and witchcraftis thus not surprising. In African aboriginal religions, witches are persons who possessaptitudes to harm through supernatural means.

Mabanckouretells thesuperiority of human mortality to that of animals advancing thatKibandithe protagonist ofMémoires de porc-épicis nothing without his animal double and the porcupine outlives him contrary to popular cultural expectation of the simultaneous demise of both connected beings.The narrator’s satiricjibeexpressesits defiance as it elaborates this interdependence:

il aura cru sa vie entière que je lui devais quelque chose, que je n’étais qu’un pauvre figurant, qu’il pouvait décider de mon destin comme bon lui semblait, eh bien, sans vouloir tirer la couverture de mon côté, je peux aussi dire la même chose à son égard puisque sans moi il n’aurait été qu’un misérablelégume, il n’aurait mêmepas valu trois gouttelettes de pipi du vieux porc-épic qui nous gouvernait à l’époque où je faisais encore partie du monde animal (12).

[he would have believed throughout his life that I owed him something, that I was nothing but a poor figure, that he could decide my destiny as it pleased him, well, not wanting to pull the blanket to my side I can say the same thing about him, since without me he would be nothing more than a miserable vegetable, he would not even be worth the urine droplets of the old porcupine who governed us at the time when I was still part of the animal world …]                                                                                           .                        [All translations of quotes from Mémoires de porc-épicare mine]

What is all too evident here and in other portions of Mémoires de porc-épicis the author’s empathy with animals, through a reversedimage of the animal as an evil being. He places the responsibility of evil thoughts and deedson the humans. The animal double is stripped of its freewill. The animal point of view of narration of the storyinterprets the anthropocentric view of nature in favour of the animal species. It demonstrates that the evil in animals is at the instance of man who employs them to do his bidding. The narrator’s character therefore invites pity instead of disdain or hatred. The animal “double” lives to gratify the needs of its human self, forced to remain at the mercy of its master’s occult passions and appetites.The narrator states : je lui obéissais sans broncher… je vais pourtant lui obéir, j’assumais ma condition de double comme une tortue qui coltinait sa carapace’’  (15) [‘‘I obeyedhimwithoutflinching … I will however obey, I consent to my condition of a double as a tortoise lugs its shell’’]. It insists later that the wickedanimal double ‘‘remplira sans protester les missions quecelui-ci luiconfiera’’ [‘‘execute without protesting the missions that the latter bids him’’], concluding with a question to which it gives a negative response : ‘‘depuisquand a-t-on vu d’ailleurs un double nuisibledédirel’homme de qui iltient son existence, hein’’ (17-18) [‘‘moreover, since when has it been seen a wicked double contradict the man to whom he owes its existence?’’]. The story attempts to upturn the old belief that familiars of witches are themselves likewise evil creatures. It indicates rather that humans are the evil specie who forces animals to be bad.  It suggests that animals are always at the losing end whenever they interact with humans.

The porcupine protagonist attempts to validate the Aristotelian philosophy that animals shared with humans such capacities as consciousness, desire, pain and imagination. It challenges the Cartesian viewpoint that disclaimed for animals rationality, consciousness, language and sentience. Descartes considered animals as mere “thoughtless” automata or machines which “cannot be said to have a mind or soul” (Regan, Introduction 4). Mabanckou successfully imbues life-force and souls into his non-human fictional creatures, bringing them at par with, and at times surpassing, humans.He puts into question the superiority of human intelligence over that of animals.In Mémoires de porc-épic,the categorical statementof the narrator attests to the lack of native intelligence in humans: ‘‘les hommesont tort de se vanterlà-dessus, je suisconvaincuqu’ils ne naissent pas avec leur intelligence’’ (25) [‘‘men are wrong to be boastful about that, I am convinced that they are not born with their intelligence’’]. At a point, the narrator immodestly employs self-praise believing that its animal companions will acknowledge its numerous virtues: ‘‘ma lucidité, mon flair, mon intelligence, ma vitesse, ma ruse…’’(68) [‘‘my clear-headedness, my flair, my intelligence, my swiftness, my wiliness’’].

In contrast, it employs several epithets to ascribe stupidity to humans, calling them “cesimbéciles” (142), “des fous du village” (149) [‘‘village fools’’]; and goes as far as to derogatorily address them as ‘‘les pauvres’’ (39) [“poor things”] for it considers them of inferior circumstance and intelligence. The ultimate denigration is to classify them as creatures to be pitied by animals: ‘‘illeurarrivaitalors de se tordre de rire, de plaindre les humains’’ (69), [‘‘it would then become twisted up in laughter, pitying the humans] .The only concession of achievement made to humansistheirability to write (to commit theirthoughts to paper) : “j’étais arrivé à la conclusion que les hommes avaient pour une fois une longueur d’avance sur nous autres les animaux puisqu’ils pouvaient consigner leurs pensées, leur imagination sur du papier » (122). [‘‘I reached the conclusion that men had for once a lead over us animals because they could commit their thoughts, their imagination to paper’’].

Animal Integrity

There is a premise that pervades the whole narration of Mémoires de porc-épic– it is that basically all life forms are equal and interdependent: human, animal, earth. It implies that all possess souls and traits that should be respected. However the story portrays that because of man’s greed, bloodthirstiness and quest for power, he has dominated and abused the animal, exploiting it for its own selfish evil ends. Mabanckou thus attempts to upturn the anthropocentric viewpoint by according animals and vegetation both intelligence and life-force.

A deep respect for animal integrity pervades the story.Mabanckou agrees through his story, with the 16th century French philosophers Montaigne and Pierre Charon who believed, not only that animals had intelligence, but that they surpassed man in virtue and nobility. By means of “sympathetic imagination” (J. M. Coetze), Mabanckou is able to think the human self and his way of life into the way of life of the animal narrator, positively imbuing it with humaneness. The animal world is credited with a social structure and territorial organisation. “je sais d’expérience que les animaux aussi sont organisés, ils ont leur territoire, leur gouverneur, leurs rivières, leurs arbres, leurs sentes, il n’y a pas que les éléphants qui possèdent un cimetière, tous les animaux tiennent à leur univers…” (127).[‘‘I know from experience that animals are also organised, they have their territory, their governor, their rivers, their trees, their ways, it is not only elephants who have a cemetery, all animals hold on to their world’’]. The author advances that the harmony and balance in that animal world must not be disturbed by man.

To further develop the image of animal integrity, Mabanckou underscores in the character of the animal narrator, attributes such as kindness, compassion, humaneness and unselfishness.The porcupine ruefullynarrates its experience of these feelingsafter each murderousmission. Its compassionate nature is underlined by its reticence against the killings its master forces him to do: ‘‘aussitôtque je me suisapproché du nourrisson, j’aieu un pincement au cœurj’aivoulurebrousserchemin’’ (178).[‘‘as soon as I approached the little baby, my heart flipped over, I wanted to retrace my steps’’]. But it was compelled to continue and accomplish its master’s bidding to kill a hapless baby because of Kibandi’s anger against his parents. The suffering and forlornness of the narrator are baldly stated (186-188).

It should likewise be stressed that when the porcupine makes any reference to his human side, it is describing its weakness not its strength. For example, whenitisveryfrightened or as nowwhenhe digresses in his narration, denigratinghumans as prevaricators: “c’est encore ma part humaine qui s’est exprimée, en effet j’ai appris de l’homme le sens de la digression, ils ne vont jamais droit au but, ouvrent des parenthèses qu’ils oublient de refermer’’ (151).[‘‘it is still my human side which has expressed itself, in fact I learnt from man the meaning of digression,they never go straight to the point, [they] open brackets which they forget to close’’].

Animal Victimhood

The porcupine’s condition of victimhood and harmlessness is also highlighted. It is portrayed as a hapless victim of the whims of its human master Kibandi – a creature constantly involved in the existential struggle of resistance and antipathy to human ethos. It is depicted as an unselfish character that is totally under the spell of its human double acting against its will as his supernatural agent of evil: “je n’aiétéque la victime des moeurs des gens de ce pays” (217). [‘‘I was nothing but the victim of the customs of the people of this region’’]. The porcupine describes its haplessness and incapacity to oppose its master, underpinning the author’s view of human domination.

Si j’avais eu le courage, j’aurais dit à mon maître que nous avons  atteint la limite de nos activités … je ne voudrais pas que tu me juges  sans tenir compte du fait que je n’étais qu’un subalterne, une ombre    dans la vie de Kibandi, je n’ai jamais appris à désobéir (188).

‘‘if I had the courage I would have told my master that we had reached the limit of our activities … I would not want you to judge  me without considering the fact that I was just a stooge, a shadow in Kibandi’s life, I never learnt to disobey’’.

Human Bestiality

Mémoires de porc-épicparticipates in the on-going zoocriticaldebate of who possesses bestiality – animals or humans. In fact, through intertextualcharacterisation, L’EscargotEntêtéa character from Mabanckou’sprevious novelVerreCassé, is announced in the annex of this novel from where he interrogates: “D’ailleurs, qui de l’Hommeou de l’animalestvraimentune bête? Vaste question!”(229). [‘‘Moreover, man or animal, who is really a beast?Huge question!’’].The novel seems to be predicated on the assumption that man’s original state is animal, and that he can very easily return to bestiality if he accedes to his base instincts. Thisis validated mainly in the blood-thirsty characters of the protagonist Kibandi and Papa Kibandi. The latterthrough his wizardry devoured a total of 99 people in the village of Mossaka, including his own brotherMatapari, sisterManiongui and nieceNiangui-Boussina. Hisdegeneracyintoanimalistic state ispithilydeclared :

tout se passait comme si, en vieillissant, Papa Kibandi retournait à l’état  animal, il ne coupait plus ses ongles, il avait les tics d’un vrai rat lorsqu’il   fallait manger, il grattait le corps à l’aide de ses orteils … le vieil homme était désormais pourvu de longues dents acérées, en particulier celles de devant, des poils gris et durs prenaient racine dans ses oreilles, arrivaient  jusqu’à la naissance de ses mâchoires…(87)

[it all happened as if in aging, Papa Kibandireturned to the animal state, he no longer cut his nails, he had the twitch of a real rat when he had to eat, he scratched his body with his toes … the old man was thence equipped with long pointed teeth, particularly the front ones, tough grey hairs took root in his ears, reaching down to the edge of his jaws].

Mabanckou’s elaborate application of contrast highlights the bestiality of humans. While the porcupinenarrator vaunts its own virtues, it denigrates man’s vices. The protagonist Kibandi’s physical traitof extreme skinniness and unprepossessing features constitute the physical ugliness popularly associated with witchesand further suggest ugliness of behaviour.The narrator dehumanisesKibandithrough the character Papa Louboto,by ascribing to the protagonist the ugliness of a cockroach and the skinniness of a photo-frame nail:‘‘Kibandiétait laid commeunepunaise, maigrecommeunclou de cadre de photo’’ (128).In the narration, humans are insultingly designated repeatedly with the epithet ‘‘les cousins germains du singe’’ (68, 127, 150). [‘‘the monkey’s first cousins’’]

Other references in the storyto the mental prowess (or lack thereof) of humans generally, are downright unflattering. Right from its incipit the narrator jeers at the acclaimed superiority of non-animal species.

donc, je ne suis qu’un animal, un animal de rien du tout, les hommes diraient une bête sauvage comme si on ne compte pas de plus bêtes et de plus sauvages que nous dans leur espèce… à vrai dire, je n’ai rien à envier aux hommes, je me moque de leur prétendue intelligence.(11)

[so, I am just an animal, an animal of no significance, men would say a savage beast as if the more beastly and more savage than us are not found amongst their specie … truly, I have nothing for which to envy men, I laugh at their supposed intelligence].

This interrogation of human intelligence continues as the porcupine’’s animal companionswondering‘‘s’ils se rendaient compte de leur arrogance, de leur supérioritéautoproclamée…’’ (69).[‘‘if they were aware of their arrogance, of their self-proclaimed superiority’’].Here the porcupine narratorpricks thebubble of humanpride and shatters his sense ofsuperiority over other animals, debasing him through an elaboration of his negative attributes – features usually associated with animals.In Kibandi’scharacter, these includeruthlessness and viciousness against his own kind.

Human bestiality is also depicted through the exposure of Kibandi’s excessive thirst for blood. He is cannibalistic – feeding on his fellow humans. He is so voracious that as at the time of his death, he has “eaten” (“a mangé”) 99 people in his village of Séképembé, and is preparing to kill a set of twin children. The porcupinenarratorsardonicallydefendsthisdespicable practice.

je dois le préciser, mon cher Baobab, pour qu’un être humain   en mange un autre il faut des raisons concrètes, la jalousie,     la colère, l’envie, l’humiliation, le manque de respect, je te jure  que nous n’avons en aucun cas mangé quelqu’un juste pour le     plaisir de le manger…(Mémoires de porc-épic, 138-139).

The sarcasm makes it clear that the proffered reasonsare not sufficient enough for man’s murderousness.The story condemnsthe deplorable values of humans and their morally anomalousconducts relating to witchcraft. Human savagery is shown even in the way suspected witches are tried – by plunging their hands up to the elbow into a pot of boiling oil to pick a silver bracelet without getting scalded (99). Then the young suitor wrongfully indicted (through a bogus investigative-corpse ritual [140-141]) of killing the girlKiminouthrough sorcery, is buried alive with the deceased “sans autreforme de procès, parcequec’étaitl’usage” (140) [“without any other form of trial, because it was the practice”].

Apart from man’s brutality to man, the cruelty of humans to animal-kind is also depicted.According to the narrator, man’s savagery was so great that his animal companions always wanted to know if man were conscious of the harm he inflicted on animals since they appeared deaf to all appeal for peaceful co-existence : ‘‘ilsavaienttoujoursvoulu savoir si les hommesétaientconscients du mal qu’ilsinfligeaient aux animaux… puisque les humains nous mènent la vie dure, puisqu’ilssont hostiles et sourds à notreappel à la co-existence pacifique’’ (68-69).Rhetorical questions by the narrator denounce cruelty to animals and animal captivity for man’s pleasure:

mais quel intérêt de passer sa vie en réclusion tel un esclave, quel intérêt d’imaginer la liberté derrière des fils barbelés,   …moi je préfère les aléas de la vie en brousse aux cages dans   lesquelles plusieurs de mes compères sont séquestrés pour terminer   un jour ou l’autre dans les marmites des humains (13-14).

[‘‘but of what interest is it to live one’s life in sequestration like a slave,      of what interest is it to imagine liberty behind bared wires, as for   me, I prefer the vagaries of life in the bush to the cages within which several of my comrades were confined to end one day or  another in the cooking pots of humans].

The narrator makes it evident that the human bestiality alsoextends to the degradation of his environment:

il y a eu des fous du village qui ont essayé de mettre fin à tes jours ,   et dans leur folie destructrice, nom d’un porc-épic, ils ont voulu te  réduire en bois de chauffe, ils ont cru que tu bouchais l’horizon, que  tu cachais la lumière du jour (149).

[there were some village fools who tied to put an end to your days,   and in their destructive madness … they wanted to reduce you to  firewood, they believed that you were blocking the horizon,  that you were obstructing the daylight…]

Man is thus condemned for his role as destroyer of nature for unreasonable purposes. Human and Animal Forms with the Earth

Expanding our critique to nature, it becomes pertinent to point out that in Mémoires de porc-épic,Mabanckou is aware of his environment and argues for the interrelatedness of all factors within the ecosystem – human, animal and plant. As his narrator is arodent, his addressee is a tree. When the porcupine experiences anguish, despondency and dread at the death of its human double, interaction with nature becomes imperative.  It communes with theBaobab tree, relieving anxiety by narrating to it all its woes.The porcupine finds solace in nature not with humanity.

One can argue that Mabanckoumaintains an ecocriticalview pointby virtue of the fact that he makes a lot of reference to African flora and fauna in his narration. He describes the beauty of the rural landscapes of Séképembé and Mossaka, detailing the forests, trees, animals, birds, hills, rivers and the elements. Besides, with his novel, Mabanckouechoes the ecologists’ appeal for peaceful co-existence amongst all of nature’s creatures. Mabanckou’sethicalmessage to his readers is an appreciation of the environment and the redirection of our thinking about the relationship between humans and animals, and betweenhumans and the earth.In using animal characters, Mabanckou’s concern is focused on theexposure of human injustice against fellow humans and against animals as well as against other non-human life forms.

InMémoires de porc-épic,substantialimportanceis placed on nature as a life-force that should not be tampered with. One can state that the Baobab which the narrator porcupine addresses in the story is also a protagonist, albeit a silent and stationary one.The character of the tree is usedecocritically by the author to convey his message to humans of respect for nature’s vegetation. The Baobab which the narrator calls “le gardien de la forêt” (149) is used to represent the totality of plant life which humans must safeguard from harm; thusthe acclamation: “tugouvernes du regard la floreentière (148). [‘‘you govern the entire flora with your look’’]. The porcupine believes the majestic tree possesses a soul, serves as a medium to communicate with the ancestors and protects the region. It declares its conviction in the powers of speech and movement attributed to the Baobab in a bygone era. The ecological message is underlined by the narrator’s direct reference to green when describing the habitat of Baobab: “tu as de la chance de vivre dans un lieu paradisiaque, tout estvertici” (148). [‘‘you are lucky to live in a heavenly place, here, all is green’’].

Mabanckou’sfable equally highlights the interconnectedness between animals and vegetation, demonstrating their mutual need of each other – the Baobab provides food, shelter, medicine and even physical and mystical protection from danger for all creatures. They in turn just like the porcupine, nourish the tree with theirfaeces and urine as organicfertiliser, though the narrator is quite quick to apologise for any perceived desecration.The porcupine believes the majestic tree possesses a soul, serves as a medium to communicate with the ancestorsand protects the region. With aphorism, it also extols the sacred uses of its sap and bark formedicinal and spiritual purposes.  It then concludes by sounding an alarm at the devastation that will occur at the destruction of Baobab: “que ta disparitionseraitpréjudiciable, fatale pour la contrée” (149) [‘‘that your destruction shall be inimical, fatal for the whole region].

Conclusion

Alain Mabanckou’sMémoires de porc-épicattempts to redefine in a holistic way, the relationship of humans andnon-human life-forms withintheir environment. The narrationportrays both human and nonhuman life forms as equal and interdependent.Mabanckou’s porcupine protagonist is a projector of morality. He presents good and evil as life’s choices but he puts the responsibility of choice squarely on humans.ThroughMémoires de porc-épichumans are indicted for their spoliation of the world’s natural vegetation instead of its conservation. The novel is an appeal to the human heart to open up to animals and our natural environment.As an advocation ofjustice, it is a clarion call for the dis-continuation of cruelty to animals, violence to humans and environmentaldegeneration. and moderation and fairness to include nature. It argues for the preservation of all life forms.It is hoped that the influence of Mabanckou’snovel on the reader, will cause her/him to echo L’EscargotEntêté’s concluding remark: “Etdepuis, je ne regarde plus les animaux avec les mêmesyeux” (229).[“Since then I no longer lookat animals with the same eyes”]. Mabanckou solicits for the reader’s understanding of the interconnectedness of all things – appealing for the respect of the integrity of human and animal minds and the life of the earth.

Works Cited

Baker, Steve. Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity and Representation. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993.

Best, Steve. The Rise of Critical Animal Studies: Putting Theory into Action and Animal   Liberation into Higher Education2013 State of Nature.                                                        .            http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=5903. Retrieved 8-25-2013

———Animal Liberation and Moral Progress: The Struggle for Human Evolution  (Rowman and Littlefield, 2013).

Coetzee, J. M. The Lives of Animals. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Courlander, Harold – A Treasury of African Folklore, New York: Marlowe & Co., 1996.

Doudoroff, Michael J. “José Emilio Pacheco: An Overview of the Poetry, 1963-86.” Hispania 72.2 (1989): 264-76.

Finnigan, Ruth – Oral Literature in Africa, Oxford Library of African Literature, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970.

Garrard, Greg. Ecocriticism: The New Critical Idiom. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

Glotfelty, Cheryll. “Introduction: Literary Studies in an Age of Environmental Crisis.” The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Eds. CheryllGlotfelty and Harold                      Fromm. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1996. xv–xxxvii.

Gossen, Gary H. “From Olmecs to Zapatistas: A Once and Future History of Souls.” American Anthropologist 96 (1994): 553-70.

Hamilton, Virginia – A Ring of Tricksters: Animal Tales from America, the West Indies, and  Africa, New York: The Blue Sky Press, 1997.

Huggan, Graham and Helen Tiffin.Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment.   London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Mabanckou, Alain. Mémoires de porc-épic. Paris :Editions du Seuil, 2006

Malamud, Randy. “The Culture of Using Animals in Literature and the Case of José Emilio Pacheco.”CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 2.2 (2000):                                          <http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1072>

Manning, Aubrey and James Serpell, eds. “Introduction.”Animals and Human Society:  Changing Perspectives. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. xi– xii.

Regan, Tom.  “The Case of Animal Rights.”In Defence of Animals.Ed. Peter Singer. Oxford:   Basil Blackwell, 1985. 13-26.

Scheub, Harold – The African Storyteller, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1999.

———African Tales, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.

Serpell, James. Introduction.The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour and Interactions with People.Ed. James Serpell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995a. 1-4.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Man’s Inhumanity to Animals.   Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Thorsons Publishers, 1975.

Soper, Kate. “The Beast in Literature: Some Initial Thoughts.” Literary Beasts: The Representation of Animals in Contemporary Literature. Comparative Critical Studies 2.3                    (2005): 303-309.

Woodward, Wendy. The Animal Gaze: Animal Subjectivities in Southern African Narratives. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008.

Dr. Eunice Omonzejie is an Associate Professor of French Studies in the Department of Modern Languages, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria. She is the Sub-Dean of the Faculty of Arts of her university. She is a scholar of African literature of French expression as well as French literature. Her areas of interest include women, masculinities and migration studies.  She has written several articles and chapters in books in both French and English. She has been the editor of the last three volumes of the interdisciplinary journal Focus on Contemporary Issues. Email: euniceomons@yahoo.co.uk

Blossom N. Fondo, The Higher Teachers’ Training College, The University of Maroua, Cameroon

Abstract

The extinction of many animal species and the threat of further extinction of even more is one of the main hazards that the natural environment is facing today. From the massive destruction of the natural habitats of these animals to large scale poaching, man’s harmful activities continue to seriously place nature in jeopardy. As these problems become more urgent there are different calls for man to rethink and change his attitude towards the environment. Richard Connell in his short story The Most Dangerous Game employs a most efficient method towards conscientizinghumans. By making humans to experience the pains of being preyed upon, he causes humans to feel exactly what animals feel thus provoking a change in their outlook and attitude towards animals. Read against a backdrop of postcolonialism and Ecocriticism, this paper holds that by changing roles and making man the hunted, Connell raises ecological consciousness and successfully draws man’s attention to the fate of the animals that they hunt and kill for their satisfaction and pleasure.

Keywords: Marginality, Ecocriticism, Zoocriticism, animal rights, Postcolonial theory, anthropocentrism, speciesism

 Introduction

Human relationships have throughout the centuries have been characterized principally by domination of one group by another based on aspects such as race, ethnicity, culture, religion and gender. This has often resulted in dichotomous and tensed relationships which sometimes lead to violence. The conquest of various regions of the world by others in what is generally referred to as colonization is one of the most glaring instances of this domination. This domination of one group by another has extended to other species whereby humankind has completely subjugated animals to a most sorry situation. Humans have in their domineering attitudes reduced animals to the position where they exist to satisfy humankind’s various desires. Thus animals now constitute the “new” colonies of humans. This explains why some critics have underlined a commonality between Ecocriticism which takes an earth-centred approach to literary studies and postcolonial studies which interrogates the European conquest and domination of other peoples and lands. Pablo Mukherjee has intimated thus:

Surely, any field purporting to theorise the global conditions of colonialism and imperialism (let us call it postcolonial studies) cannot but consider the complex interplay of environmental categories such as water, land, energy, habitat, migration with political or cultural categories such as state, society, conflict, literature, theatre, visual arts. Equally, any field purporting to attach interpretative importance to environment (let us call it eco/environmental studies) must be able to trace the social, historical and material coordinates of categories such as forests, rivers, bio-regions and species. (Qtd in Huggan and Tiffin;2)

This justifies the adoption of both ecocritism and postcolonial theory in analyzing the subject of anthropocentrism in Richard Connell’s The Most Dangerous Game. The story shows that ways in which humans reduce animals to mere objects for their pleasure.

While the last century was one whose major problem according to W.E.B. Dubois was that of the colour bar, it is clear to everyone that the problem of this present century is one of an environmental/ecological order. All over the globe today the ruin of the natural environment and the consequences thereof are glaring: the loss of the tropical rainforests with the loss of habitats of many animal species, the rising sea level, acid rains, global warming amongst a plethora of others constitute just a tip of the iceberg of the ecological crises which humankind’s harmful activities continue to create and/or exacerbate. Among these problems the natural world faces today, the extinction of many animal species continue to occupy an important place. Humankind’s activities have deprived many animals of their natural habitats and their source of feeding exposing them to destruction. But beyond this there is the direct destruction of some of these animal species through poaching and excessive hunting of even protected species in different regions of the world. Some of these animals are killed for their fur, others for leather some for other ornamental objects for humankind’s luxuries. While in certain regions, hunting for pleasure still constitutes a source of leisure for many individuals and is carried out on a large scale.  All of these jeopardize the non-human animal species which are daily destroyed for the pleasure and luxuries of humans.  Besides these, human’s destruction of some of these animal species most often involve putting them through pain which humans totally disregard. Thus animals are subjected to cruel treatment by the humans. This has been preceded by the subjection of animals to an inferior status not unlike what reserved for many of the colonized people the world over. Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin have underscored this when they hold that:

Animal categorizations and the use of animal metaphors have been and are characteristic of human languages is often in association with racism and speciesism: ‘you stupid cow’; politicians with their ‘snouts in the trough’; ‘male chauvinist pig’. The history of human oppression of other humans is replete with instances of animal metaphors and animal categorizations frequently deployed to justify exploitation and objectification, slaughter and enslavement. (135)

There have been many calls for humans to change their attitude towards the other elements of nature. This is important because the ecological crisis the world is facing today is indiscriminate affecting both the human and non-human elements of nature. Within the humanities, ecocriticism has been established as the response of the literati to these problems for as CheryllGlotfelty (1996) has insinuated: “as environmental problems compound, work as usual seems unconscionably frivolous. If we’re not part of the solution, we’re part of the problem” (xxi). Similarly, postcolonial theory has proved itself to be one of the theories best suited to approach questions of subjugation and discrimination; thus Huggan and Tiffin have underlined that “postcolonialism’s major theoretical concerns: otherness, racism and miscegenation, language, translation, the trope of cannibalism, voice and the problems of speaking of an for others- to name just a few – offer immediate entry points for a re-theorising of the place of animals in relation to human societies” (135).  This paper therefore attempts an ecocritical and postcolonial reading of Richard Connell’s short story The Most Dangerous Game to show how the author in this story successfully builds the case against the destruction of the other animal species of the ecosystem by humans. He stands against cruelty to animals and their wanton destruction by humans through a technique of role reversal whereby humans experience the dynamics of being hunted and preyed upon.

Constructing Anthropocentrism and Cruelty to Animals

However, before delving into Connell’s construction of this case it is imperative to give a definition of the term ecocriticism. According to CheryllGlofelty “ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and the physical environment… ecocriticism takes an earth-centered approach to literary studies” (xviii). This earth-centered approach also includes the other animal species of the earth and this is why in this text, I adopt an ecocritical analysis because Connell’s interest in and engagement of the non-human draws a relationship between literature and the physical environment since animals constitute part of this physical environment. For its part, postcolonial theory is interested in interrogating the colonial entreprise and its “material practices and effects, such as transportation, slavery, displacement, emigration, and racial and cultural discrimination” (Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, 7). Ashcroft et al however add in a later text that postcolonial theory has extended to address issues pertaining to the environment. They state thus:

One of the most persistent and controversial topics of contemporary politics is the issue of the environment. Global warming has demonstrated the devastating effects of the industrial revolution and the unfettered pursuit of capital expansion. The environment and attendant topics such as ecofeminism, ecological imperialism, environmentalism, speciesism have all taken an increasingly prominent place in post-colonial thought because it has become clear that there is a direct connection between colonialist treatment of indigenous flora and fauna and the treatment of colonized and otherwise dominated societies. (viii)

This concern with the environment explains the use of postcolonial theory in this analysis.

The Most Dangerous Game opens with a conversation between two game hunters Whitney and Rainsford about the art of hunting. This conversation marks the beginning of the construction of anthropocentricism and cruelty towards animals. In the course of their conversation, Whitney expresses the hope that the jaguar guns have come from Purdey’s. This establishes the fact that the story concerns hunting of animals by humans as Whitney adds that: “we should have some good hunting up the Amazon. Great sport hunting” (8), to which Rainsford the great game hunter replies “the best sport in the world” (8). These statements from these hunters show how much humans have placed themselves at the center of the universe to the point of considering the destruction of other species a sport, a source of pleasure and leisure. Humans have no consideration for other species considering them as not only inferior, but worse of all dispensable. Huggan and Tiffin observe that “within many cultures […] anthropocentrism has long been natularized. The absolute prioritization of one’s own species’ interest over those of the silenced majority is still regarded as being ‘only natural’ (5). The conversation continues thus:

“For the hunter” amended Whitney, “Not for the Jaguar”

“Don’t talk rot, Whitney” said Rainsford. “You’re a big-game hunter, not a philosopher. “Who cares how a jaguar feels?”

“Perhaps the jaguar does”. Observed Whitney

“Bah! They’ve no understanding.”

“Even so I think they understand one thing- fear. The fear of pain and the fear of death” (8).

This conversation is illuminating as it portrays through Rainsford humanity’s indifference and disregard for other animal species, especially their pain and suffering. Whitney, although a game-hunter himself is apparently developing some sympathy for the jaguar that they hunt and kill but not Rainsford who cynically asks who cares what a jaguar feels. Through this conversation Connell constructs anthropocentricism, whereby humans consider themselves not as part of the ecosystem, but rather as being above the ecosystem where they have the right to wrongfully use other co-owners of their natural space for their sport. So to Rainsford, the feelings of the animals are inconsequential and all that matters is the great pleasure that he derives from hunting them. Thus he concludes the argument with Whitney with the anthropocentric observation that “the world is made up of two classes – the hunters and the huntees [sic]Luckily you and I are the hunters” (8). This statement aptly captures and summarizes the belief of humans that they are superior to every other animal specie and therefore can do with them as they deem fit.Huggan and Tiffin cite Plumwood who argues that

The western definition of humanity depended and still depends on the presence of the ‘non-human’: the uncivilized, the animal and the animalistic. European justification for invasion and colonialism proceeded from this basis, understanding non-European lands and he people and animals that inhabited them as ‘spaces’, ‘unused’, underused or empty. The very idea of colonization is thus one where anthropocentrism and Eurocentrism are inseparable. (5)

The European attitude towards non-Europeans can be seen at work here in the attitude of humans towards non-humans. It is a form of colonization based this time around on specie.

Humans therefore disregard any pains that animals experience in the process of being hunted and simply take pleasure in their position as lords of the universe. Humans do not consider themselves as part of the natural ecosphere where there is need for sharing and mutual respect as a prelude to peaceful co-existence, rather they see themselves as the masters of the universe, the only specie entitled to feelings and worthy of consideration even when they neither consider the feelings of the other species. This stands in stark opposition to Barry Commoner’s first law of Ecology that “everything is connected to everything else” (qtd in Glotfelty:xix).

Shortly after this exchange, Rainsford accidentally falls off the yacht into the sea from where he painstakingly swims to the shore. As he is swimming to shore he hears gunshots and decides to follow that direction because these gunshots can only mean human presence. This is confirmed when he hears a “high screaming sound, the sound of an animal in an extremity of anguish and terror” (10). Once again we are confronted with human cruelty towards animals and Rainsford observes that “where there are pistol shots, there are men” (10). The full evidence of this and the consequence thereof are seen when shortly thereafter, Rainsford comes across signs of a killed animal:

Some wounded thing, by the evidence a large animal, had thrashed about in the underbrush; the jungle weeds were crushed down and the moss lacerated; one patch of weed was stained crimson. A small, glittering object not far away caught Rainsford’s eye and he picked it up, it was an empty cartridge.

“A twenty-two”, he remarked. “That’s odd. It must have been a fairly large animal too. The hunter had his nerve to tackle it with a light gun. It’s clear that the brute put up a fight. I suppose the first three shots I heard was when the hunter flushed his quarry and wounded it. The last shot was when he trailed it here and finished it. (10/11)

This is an extremely illuminating passage as to the cruel treatment humans mete to non-human animals. Here is a case where for the pleasure of the hunter, he shoots and wounds an animal, then lets it wonder in pain and agony before chasing and finally killing it. This hunter selects a light gun which will not instantly kill the animal but helps to prolong its suffering. The imagery that Connell employs in the above description goes a long way to show how the harmful activities of humans negatively affect the natural environment. He says the “jungle weeds were crushed down”, the “moss lacerated” and the weed “stained crimson”. All of these symbolize the destruction of the natural environment by humans. Thus from the very beginning of the story, Connell establishes man’s destructive tendency towards other species, whereby he places himself above all else, not as a protector but as an abuser. Rainsford does not care how animals that are chased, wounded, and destroyed feel.

Later, when Rainsford finds himself at the chateau of General Zaroff, he is greeted as follows: “it is a very great pleasure and honor to welcome Mr. Sanger Rainsford, the celebrated hunter, to my home” (12). So Rainsford has already established his reputation as a celebrated game hunter to the point of writing a book on hunting as General Zaroff continues: “I’ve read your book about hunting snow leopards in Tibet, you see” (12). Here it is seen how a reputation as hunter-cum-destroyer of other species is considered commendable and such an individual is treated with respect.

Further proof of man’s destruction of animals is presented in the house of General Zaroff whose dinning room is decorated with the heads of numerous animals he has killed: “about the hall were the mounted heads of many animals – lions, tigers, elephants, moose, bears; larger or more perfect specimens Rainsford had never seen” (12).  Rainsford admires all of these heads and even remarks to the General that “You have some wonderful heads here”, said Rainsford  as he ate a particularly well cooked filet mignon. “That cape buffalo is the largest I ever saw” (13). Both Rainsford and General Zaroff are big game hunters whose greatest sport is hunting.

General Zaroff like Rainsford is an experienced hunter who has been involved in hunting for the greater part of his life, having been introduced into hunting by his father at the incredible age of five. He recounts that:

When I was only five years old he gave me a little gun, specially made in Moscow for me to shoot sparrows with. When I shot some of his prize turkeys with it, he did not punish me; he complemented me on my marksmanship. I killed my first bear in the Caucasus when I was ten…my whole life has been one prolonged hunt…I have hunted every kind of game in every land. It would be impossible for me to tell you how many animals I have killed. (14)

He continues recounting that after he left Russia he continued hunting: “naturally, I continued to hunt – grizzlies in your Rockies, Crocodiles in the Ganges, rhinoceroses in East Africa. It was in Africa that the Cape buffalo hit me and laid me up for six months. As soon as I recovered I started for the Amazon to hunt jaguars…” (14). So General Zaroff like Rainsford has made hunting a life sport and it is seen how he boasts of the countless number of animals he has killed for his pleasure. Once again this points to human cruelty to other species born of his/her feeling of superiority over other species.To him, these animals he has killed throughout his life constitute trophies. He does not care that he has killed more animals than he can recollect, all that matters is his great incomparable skill in hunting of which he is so boastful. From such a perspective, animals are barely there to serve the needs of humans. Their feelings and their right to an existence are denied them by humans who have arrogated to themselves the position of master of the universe. This is what Huggan and Tiffin citing Plumwood call ‘hegemonic centrism’ which “accounts not only for environmental racism, but also for institutionalized speciesism that continue to be and to rationalize the exploitation of animal (and animalized human) ‘others’ in the name of a human- and reason- centred culture that is at least a couple of millennia old (5).

This conversation between General Zaroff and Rainsford sets the next stage of this paper which involves role-changing wherein Rainsford the big game hunter now becomes the hunted and experiences first hand the raw fear that being hunted and preyed upon elicits. By showing what animals go through, Connell discourages their senseless destruction.

 Reversal of Roles and the Case against Animal Destruction

In the course of their conversation, Rainsford says he has always considered the Cape Buffalo as the most dangerous game. The general however tells him that he is wrong because he has more dangerous game on his island and when Rainsford asks if this could be tigers, the General responds that “hunting tigers ceased to interest me some years ago. I exhausted their possibilities, you see, no thrill left in tigers, no real danger. I live for danger, Mr. Rainsford” (13).

With this statement, General Zaroff, tells Rainsford that he now hunts other humans because he can match his reason against theirs whereas non-human animals have only instinct which is no match for him. He therefore tells Rainsford that he will have to become his next prey, or be brutally killed by his bodyguard if he refuses. Faced with no better choice Rainsford agrees and the General asks him to have a three days lead ahead of him and he will chase him thereafter. Rainsford thus sets out fleeing for his life. The author says of him thus “Rainsford had fought his way through the bush for two hours. “I must keep my nerve. I must keep my nerve” (19). Here he becomes the prey, the hunted. The tables have turned and thus begins his experience of what the animals he hunts experience, the animals whom he declares he does not care how they feel. The author continues that “His whole idea was to put distance between himself and General Zaroff, and to this end, he had plunged along, spurred by the sharp rowels of something very like panic” (19). He starts experiencing the panic and fear and interestingly in this new position as hunted, he draws from other preys of his as he “executed a series of intricate loops,…recalling the lore of the fox hunt, and all the dodges of the fox” (19). At a point he thinks “I have played the fox, now I must play the cat of the fable” (19), here he climbs a tree to rest.

Soon thereafter, Rainsford is terrified that the General has successfully decoded his intricate trail to the point of searching through the trees for him. When after searching, the General smiles and leaves, Rainsford experiences terror: first of all because he realizes that General Zaroff could follow a trail through the night and a very difficult trail at that. But worse of all he harbors another thought which “sent a shudder of cold terror through his whole being” (20), and this is because he suddenly realizes that General Zaroff’s smile as he looked up the tree in which he was hiding, can only mean that had found him out but was merely prolonging the hunt so as to have greater pleasure by walking away and not killing him. At this point in time, Rainsford comes to the full realization that he had indeed become the prey when he understands that “the Cossack was the cat; he was the mouse” (20). This is the most ironical scene of the story because hitherto Rainsford had bragged to Whitney that he was the hunter and not the huntee [sic].

Furthermore, when Rainsford sets a trap that unfortunately for him does not kill the General but only slightly injures him, Rainsford once again experiences raw fear “Rainsford with fear gripping his heart, heard the General’s mocking laugh ring through the jungle” (22). Before now Rainsford had mockingly dismissed the fear of hunted animals but now he experiences it first hand causing him once again to take flight like the hunted animal he has become “it was flight now, a desperate, hopeless flight that carried him on for some time” (21).

Connell continues to develop Rainsford’s experience of fear when he succeeds in killing one of General Zaroff’s dogs and the General brings his whole pack of hounds to hunt Rainsford. It is said that when he awakens to the sound of the baying of a pack of hounds, this “made him know new things about fear” (22).

When the hounds pick up his scent and start chasing him, it is said of him that “he ran for his life” but beyond this, what is most important is that at this point “Rainsford knew now how an animal at bay feels” (23). Within the framework of this paper, I consider this to be the climax of the story, where Rainsford comes to realize that hunted animals experience true and painful fear. He goes back on what he had said before to Whitney at the beginning of the story and acknowledges that animals too have feelings worthy of consideration.

At the end of the day, faced with the pack of hounds and the sea, Rainsford chooses what to him is the lesser evil. He jumps into the sea. He however swims back to General Zaroff’s chateau, and kills him.

Conclusion

Through a highly successful reversal of roles, Connell develops a strong case against human’s wanton destruction of other life forms, through hunting, and destruction of game for human pleasure and satisfaction. Whereas at the beginning of the story, Rainsford is an accomplished hunter who despises and disregards the feelings of the animals, by the end of the story, having lived through what a hunted animal feels, he doubtlessly has a change of heart.

It is important that in his dangerous game with the general he does not die, otherwise the purpose of consciousness- raising as far as animals are concerned will fall to pieces. As a survivor, he stands a better chance of advocating for animal rights and to stand against human cruelty to them. Furthermore, the reader by sharing in Rainsford’s fear and terror develops consideration for animals as well.

Connell has thus given voice to the voiceless or devoiced animals to express themselves to humans showing them what pains they experience when they are hunted. He does this by making a human to ‘wear the shoes’ of the animals so as to know exactly where it pinches. Reading through this story can therefore cause humans to rethink their actions against non-human animals. Thus ecocriticism which draws the relationship between literature and the physical environment has proved vital in the analysis of this text, highlighting the ways in which literature can serve more purposes than mere entertainment. Also, postcolonialism has permitted me to conceptualize the relationship of power and powerlessness that characterizes human/non-human relationship. The American Ecocritic Lawrence Buell has iterated that “criticism worthy of its name arises from commitment deeper than professionalism”(9). It is in this regard that Ecocriticism and postcolonialism, two theories that are committed to social change have guided this analysis.

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Blossom N. Fondo holds a PhD in English specialized in Commonwealth and Postcolonial Literatures from the University of Yaoundé I. She teaches in the Department of English and Literatures of English Expression at the Higher Teachers’ College of the University of Maroua. She has been a visiting scholar at Dickinson College and New York University in the USA. Her main areas of interest include; Postcolonial theory, Anglophone Caribbean and African Literature, Ecocriticism as well as African-American Literature. She has published in these fields both nationally and internationally.